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NOTE
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF WESTSIDE
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v MERGENS:
THREE "R's" + RELIGION = MERGENS
LEAH GALLANT MORGENSTEIN
The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the
most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no
activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than
in its schools, to avoid confusing, not to say fusing, what the Con-
stitution sought to keep strictly apart.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1981, in Widmar v. Vincent, 2 the Supreme Court held that a pol-
icy of equal access on a state university campus providing an open
forum for meetings of both religious and non-religious student
groups did not violate the establishment clause of the Constitution. 3
Three years later, Congress codified the Court's decision and ex-
tended the right of equal access to the public secondary school fo-
rum in the Equal Access Act ("Act").4 On June 4, 1990, the Court,
in Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,5 ruled on
the constitutionality of the Act both on its face and as applied to a
public secondary school. 6 The Court decided that once a public sec-
ondary school creates a limited open forum, the school may not
deny access to or discriminate against any noncurriculum related
1. Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
2. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
3. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). See infra notes 60-72 and accompanying
text (discussing Widmar).
4. Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1302 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074
(1988)). See infra note 74 and accompanying text (suggesting that Equal Access Act applied
Widmar to public high schools).
5. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
6. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370 (1990).
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student group based on the religious, political, philosophical, or
other content of the students' speech2 A plurality of the Court
found the Act to survive an establishment clause challenge by the
school board and required the school to provide access to a reli-
gious student group.8
By upholding the right of a religious student group to have equal
access to the premises of a federally funded secondary school,
Mergens triggers several constitutional concerns. The equal access
issue demands careful consideration of the balance between the
right of students to speak freely and the need for schools to control
the educational development of students. In addition, the equal ac-
cess issue necessitates an examination of the tension between the
free speech and free exercise clauses of the first amendment on one
hand, and the establishment clause on the other.
This Note discusses the constitutionality of equal access in public
secondary schools and analyzes the decision in Mergens. Part I pro-
vides an overview of establishment clause jurisprudence and ex-
plains the public forum doctrine, the analytical framework used in
many equal access cases. Part I also discusses the Equal Access Act
and the early treatment of equal access cases in federal courts of
appeals. Part II reviews the Supreme Court opinion in Mergens. Part
III critiques the Court's finding that the Act is constitutional. Part
IV offers recommendations for resolving the equal access contro-
versy in public secondary schools. In concluding, this Note suggests
that the plurality in Mergens mischaracterized the scope of Widmar v.
Vincent in light of the specific forum in existence at Westside High
School. By adhering to the ambiguous dictates of the Equal Access
Act, the Court underestimated the potential danger of government
endorsement of religious speech and provided a backdoor access for
organized prayer to enter public schools. Recognizing the sensitive
relationship between students' free speech rights and the govern-
ment's role in the public schools, this Note recommends returning
to a case-by-case analysis of equal access in public secondary
schools.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Establishment Clause
The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
7. Il
8. Id. at 2370-73 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
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cise thereof. . . ."9 The first religion clause, the establishment
clause, mandates state neutrality, not hostility, toward religion. 10 In
order to achieve neutrality, government must strive to accommo-
date religion without either advancing or discriminating against par-
ticular religious groups. 1 Establishment clause violations do not
involve individual religious behavior or speech. Rather, violations
of the establishment clause occur when state action tends to estab-
lish religion.' 2
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The establishment clause was extended to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (applying
establishment clause to states for first time); L. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTUnONAL LAw § 14-2,
at 1156 & n.15 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing first application of establishment clause to states in
Everson). Throughout American jurisprudential history, scholars and judges have struggled to
find a satisfactory interpretation of the religion clauses of the first amendment. The inherent
conflict between the directives of the establishment clause, prohibiting the establishment of a
state religion, and the free exercise clause, protecting individual expressions of religion, often
sends interpreters to examine the framer's intent. Seegenerally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrru-
TIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1158-66 (2d ed. 1988) (setting forth theories to guide understanding of
history and interpretation of religion dauses).
A student commentator addressed religion clause jurisprudence in the context of the pub-
lic/private distinction in political discourse. Comment, Private Personal But Not Split: Radin
Versus Rorly, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1783, 1793 & n.50 (1990). In discussing the interplay between
the religion clauses in the public schools, the Comment speculated that the establishment
clause may continue to be a "special mandate for secularism in government operations,"
pragmatically preferred in the public school context over the free exercise mandate. Id. The
author further contended that this preference is motivated by our public conception ofjustice,
morality, and prudence, and is actually independent of controversial religious doctrine. Id.
This Note focuses on the interaction between the establishment clause and the free speech
clause of the first amendment and does not attempt a discussion of the free exercise clause.
For a discussion of the history of the religion clauses, see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
605-06 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring).
10. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (stating that first amendment
"requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary").
11. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1952) (upholding school program al-
lowing release time religious instruction off school premises as mere accommodation of reli-
gious needs of students). The Court in Zorach stated:
Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction
nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one or
some religion on any person. But we find no constitutional requirement which
makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight
against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.
Id at 314; see also Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor,J., concurring) (stating
that common purpose of religion clauses is to secure religious liberty). The establishment
clause protects the interest of religious and non-religious minorities by preventing state coer-
cion of religious choice. Comment, Toward Religious Neutrality in the Public School Curriculum, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 899, 913 (1989). The protection of minorities is particularly important in the
context of public schools because of the socialization process inherent in education. Id.
Advocates of equal access argue that providing access to all groups diminishes the appear-
ance ofhostility toward any particular group and accommodates individual points of view. See
Comment, The Equal Access Controversy: A Battle for Freedom of Religious Speech in Public Secondary
Schools, 17 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 369, 381-92 (1990) (suggesting that equal access policy fosters
government neutrality and does not violate establishment clause).
12. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (defining state actions that violate establishment
clause); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 552 (1985) (Burger, CJ.,
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In Lemon v. Kurtzman,' 3 the Court enunciated a framework to
guide courts in considering whether state action comports with the
establishment clause.14 The three-prong Lemon test states that a
policy will not offend the establishment clause if: (1) it has a secular
legislative purpose; (2) its primary effect is neither to advance nor
to inhibit religion; and (3) it does not foster an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.' 5
1. Secular purpose
Establishment clause case law does not provide clear guidance as
to whether any particular secular purpose will satisfy the first prong
of the Lemon test or whether the purpose must be clearly secular.16
Members of the Court disagree over the amount of deference to
accord legislatures in considering the secular purpose prong of the
Lemon inquiry.' 7 All agree, however, that if a court finds that a law
dissenting) (distinguishing between state establishment of religion that violates first amend-
ment and individual advocacy of religion which does not).
13. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
14. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-94 (1987) (finding that if primary
purpose of Act is to endorse particular religious doctrine, Act will fail first prong of Lemon
test); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-61 (1985) (finding that any secular purpose will sat-
isfy first prong of Lemon test); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-84 (1984) (holding that
even one clear secular purpose will satisfy secular purpose prong).
17. In Wallace, the Court, citingJustice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch, stated that the
first amendment forbids governmental action if it is entirely motivated by a desire to advance
religion. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor advised that
courts must defer to the legislators and make a limited inquiry into their motivations. Id at
73-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring). If there is a plausible secular purpose, courts should defer
to the stated intent of the legislature. It at 74-75. A statute, however, will not pass constitu-
tional muster if the articulated purpose is merely a sham. Id at 75. Justice Rehnquist argued,
however, that deferring to legislative purpose has little meaning, as legislators need only ex-
press any secular purpose and omit all sectarian references. Id. at 108 (Rehnquist,J., dissent-
ing).
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Edwards v. Aguillard, did not defer to legislative
intent but inquired more deeply into the legislature's "preeminent purpose." Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-89 (1987) (invalidating Creationism Act, which forbade teaching
evolution in public school unless accompanied by instruction in theory of "creation science,"
as violative of establishment clause). Justice Brennan examined the legislative history of the
Creationism Act because he was aware of the particular concerns that arise in the context of
public schools. Id. at 583-85. He found that although the Act did have a secular purpose of
enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction, the primary purpose of the Act was to en-
dorse a particular religious doctrine in violation of the establishment clause. Id. at 594.
In his concurrence in Edwards, Justice Powell outlined a series of steps that courts should
take to complete the secular purpose inquiry. Id at 597-604 (Powell, J., concurring). The
courts should first look to the language of the statute itself, interpreting words by their every-
day, common meaning. Id. at 597-99. Finding a religious purpose alone is not enough to
invalidate a statute-the religious purpose must predominate. Id at 599. If the legislation in
question is ambiguous on its face, the Court should look to the legislative history. Id. If, as in
Edwards, lower courts are unable to find a valid secular purpose, the Supreme Court should
hesitate to find one. Id. at 603. If it is clear that some religious purpose underlies the legisla-
tion's purpose, no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind the Court to
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has failed the secular purpose prong, it need not consider the re-
maining two prongs of the analysis.18 If a state's policy survives the
first prong of the Lemon test, a court must then determine whether
the policy can satisfy both the primary effect and excessive entangle-
ment prongs. 19
2. Primary effect
The second prong of the Lemon test asks whether a policy's pri-
mary effect advances or inhibits religion. In essence, it examines
whether implementation of the state's policy has a neutral effect.20
In applying the primary effect prong, a court should strive to uphold
policies that protect religious speech and do not impermissibly pro-
mote or exhibit hostility toward religion.2' A state's policy may ac-
commodate religion and may even result in "incidental benefits" to
religion without advancing sectarian viewpoints. 22 A state policy
that has the effect of endorsing or disapproving of any religion or all
religions, however, is impermissible. 23
3. Excessive entanglement
The third prong of the Lemon test evaluates whether a state's pol-
icy entails excessive government entanglement with religion. 24 The
that fact. lId at 603-04. If no secular purpose is identified, the statute violates the establish-
ment clause. Id at 597.
Justice Scalia, however, advocated extreme deference to the legislature. Id. at 626-27
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court's duty is to try to uphold the statute. Id at 626. Justice
Scalia warned that invalidation under the secular purpose prong is appropriate only when the
action is wholly motivated by a purpose to advance religion and has no secular purpose. Id. at
614. Justice Scalia criticized the use of the secular purpose prong as unworkable, finding it
too difficult to discern the legislature's purpose. Id. at 636-40. He suggested abandonment
of the secular purpose prong altogether. Id
18. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585.
19. Id at 582-83.
20. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); see Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-85 & n.39 (1973) (finding that policy with any direct effect of advanc-
ing religion is impermissible even though primary effect is secular); Comment, Beyond
Neutrality: Equal Access and the Meaning of Religious Freedom, 12 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK LJ. 335,
369 (1989-90) (recognizing neutrality principle in primary effect prong, but arguing that it can
be misleading).
21. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (arguing that establishment
clause mandates state neutrality toward religion).
22. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273-75 (1981) (differentiating between primary
and incidental benefits and finding only latter to be permissible).
23. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15; see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-94 (1984)
(O'Connor,J., concurring) (outliningJustice O'Connor's reformulation of Lemon test). Justice
O'Connor stated that, "[t]he effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual
purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval."
Id at 690; see infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's "en-
dorsement test").
24. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); see Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of
Equal Access Policies and Legislation Allowing Organized Student-Initiated Religious Activities in the Pub-
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goal of this analysis is to ensure the separation of church and state. 25
For example, a court may find that church and state are intertwined
excessively if the state must engage in continuing administrative su-
pervision of sectarian activity, such as faculty oversight of student
prayer meetings. 26 Entanglement results when a policy authorizes a
state to monitor religious activity. The state involvement may
threaten the voluntarism of religious observance and violate the
principle of separation.27 Government entanglement in religious
activities, resulting in an appearance of favoritism for one sect over
another, causes a divisiveness among religions that the establish-
ment clause was designed to prevent.28
4. The trend toward Justice O'Connor's endorsement test
Since its adoption by the Supreme Court in 1971, commentators
and members of the Court have criticized the Lemon test.29 Justice
O'Connor first introduced the endorsement test, a reformulation of
the Lemon test, in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.3" Jus-
tice O'Connor restated the endorsement test in Wallace v. Jaffree,3 1
lic High Schools: A Proosalfor a Unitary First Amendment Forum Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q
529, 574 (1985) (asserting that third prong of Lemon test is duplicative of primary effect
prong).
25. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
26. See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that au-
thorization of student-initiated voluntary prayer would violate establishment clause by creat-
ing unconstitutional link between church and state), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
27. Id
28. See Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1406-07 (10th Cir.
1985) (finding that permitting voluntary religious meetings at public schools before start of
school day could result in excessive entanglement and political divisiveness in community).
29. Justice Rehnquist suggested that "[tihe true meaning of the Establishment Clause
can only be seen in its history." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that a proper reading ofhistory gives the establishment
clause a well-accepted meaning, forbidding establishment of a national religion and forbid-
ding preference among religious sects or denominations. Id. at 106. He further asserted that
the framers did not intend the establishment clause to require government neutrality between
religion and irreligion, nor to prohibit the federal government from providing nondiscrimina-
tory aid to religion. Id Justice Rehnquist advocated abandoning the Lemon test, partly be-
cause it is based on an improper reading of history. lIL at 108.
Chief Justice Burger, also dissenting in Wallace, stated that the Lemon test exists only to
provide signposts to courts and does not provide a bright line. Id. at 89 (Burger, CJ., dissent-
ing). Chief Justice Burger supported the concept of "benevolent neutrality." Id. at 90. A
government should be able to accommodate religion in a wholly neutral and noncoercive
manner. Id.
30. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (re-
jecting absolutist approach to establishment clause and upholding display of cr6che despite
fact that display advanced religion "in a sense"). In Lynch, Justice O'Connor suggested the
Court focus on endorsement and ask what the city intended to communicate in displaying the
cr~che and what message the city's display actually conveyed. Id. at 690 (emphasis in original).
31. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor advocated
reexamining and refining the standards announced in Lemon to make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the first amendment. Id. at 68-69.
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and a plurality of the Court expressly adopted the test in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU.3 2 Justice O'Connor's test reformulates the first
two prongs of the Lemon inquiry.
The secular purpose prong of the Lemon test concerns the govern-
ment's subjective intent: "whether the government intends to con-
vey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion." 33 The
primary effect prong focuses on the objective effect of the govern-
ment practice, examining whether it has "the effect of communicat-
ing a message of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion." 34 A statute violates the establishment clause if either
prong is answered affirmatively. 35 A statute surviving the first two
prongs may still be invalidated on establishment clause grounds
under the excessive entanglement prong.36
Justice O'Connor's test focuses on government endorsement and
asks if the endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders and an accompanying message to adherents that they
are favored members of the political community.3 7 Under the en-
dorsement test, the establishment clause is violated "when the gov-
ernment makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's
standing in the political community."38 In recent establishment
clause cases, a plurality of the Court has upheld lower court applica-
32. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-613 (1989) (plurality opinion). In
Allegheny, Justice Blackmun framed the issue as whether the display of the creche and menorah
in their particular physical settings have the effect of endorsing or disapproving religious be-
liefs. Id. at 597.
While the Allegheny plurality adopted Justice O'Connor's test, Justice Kennedy criticized the
endorsement test as fundamentally flawed and unworkable in practice. Id. at 669 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy concluded that while the endorsement test purports to result
in neutrality, it results in hostility toward religion. Id at 665. Justice Kennedy reaffirmed his
distaste for the endorsement test and reiterated his "coercion" analysis in Mergens. Board of
Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2377 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see infra notes 157-
60 and accompanying text (describing Justice Kennedy's coercion test).
In the context of public displays of religious symbolsJustice Stevens found little difference
between Justice Kennedy's test, emphasizing coercion; Justice O'Connor's test, prohibiting
endorsement; and the Lemon test, preventing state action with the purpose and effect of pro-
viding support for specific faiths. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 649-50 (Stevens,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens stated that the establishment clause should be con-
strued to create a strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on public prop-
erty. Id at 650-51.
33. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 688, 691 (1984) (O'ConnorJ, concurring). UnderJus-
tice O'Connor's reformulation of the Lemon test, the inquiry into the government's intent is
deferential and limited. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74-75 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
34. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The relevant issue is "whether an
objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the
statute, would perceive it as state endorsement of prayer in public schools." Wallace, 472 U.S.
at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
35. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. Id.
37. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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tions of the endorsement test, perhaps signalling that it may be
leaning toward a complete adoption ofJustice O'Connor's reformu-
lation of the Lemon test.39
B. Public Forum Doctrine and Equal Access
In cases concerning access to public school property, students ar-
gue that the first amendment protects their right to express reli-
gious viewpoints at school. 40 Before passage of the Equal Access
Act, the question of whether school administrators could deny ac-
cess to student religious groups based on the content of their
speech was most often addressed under the first amendment public
forum doctrine.4 1 In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educa-
39. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370-73 (O'Connor, J., plurality)
(1990) (adopting endorsement test); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-613
(1989) (describing evolution of establishment clause jurisprudence and adopting endorse-
ment test regardless of whether key word in test is endorsement, favoritism, or promotion).
See generally Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Justice O'Connor's Endorsement Test, 68 N.C.L.
REv. 590 (1990) (explaining history of establishment clause cases and suggesting endorse-
ment test as method of achieving goal of neutrality). Application of the Lemon test may actu-
ally produce separationist results, while use of the endorsement test results in neutrality. Id.
at 608; see also Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment Clause
Analysis, 40 AM. U.L. REv. 503, 536-40 (1990) (suggesting that reformulation of endorsement
test applied with reasonable nonadherent standard rather than objective observer standard is
most faithful to principle of neutrality).
40. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2363 (1990) (claiming denial of
access for student Christian club violates first amendment rights); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 265 (1981) (finding first amendment violations when students were denied access to
school facilities for religious worship and teaching).
41. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-70 (1981) (using public forum analy-
sis and striking down exclusion of student religious group from university's activities); Lub-
bock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1042-48 (5th Cir.
1982) (following public forum analysis used in Brandon to determine that high school is not
public forum), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971,
976-80 (2d Cir. 1980) (employing public forum analysis, but finding that high school is not
public forum), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981). One method of analysis, the O'Brien two-
track analysis, finds that a government regulation is justified if (1) it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; (2) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and (3) if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). If the interest is related to suppression of expression,
strict scrutiny review is used. If not, a mere balancing review is used. See generally GuNcinra,
CONs~rr-roNAL LAw ch. 12 (11th ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989) (discussing public forum and
O'Brien two-track justification scheme as two contemporary methods of analysis).
But see Teitel, supra note 24, at 579-90 (suggesting unitary forum analysis that determines
government's purpose and involvement in each particular forum as way to reconcile compet-
ing free exercise and establishment clause concerns). Following the public forum doctrine
outlined in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1988),
Teitel determines the purpose and use of the forum at issue. Teitel, supra note 24, at 584.
She examines whether there is a government purpose in free expression as well as the extent
of government control and involvement in the forum. Id. at 582. This analysis vitiates the
need to balance first amendment interests because of the inverse but interdependent relation-
ship between the religion clauses. Id. at 583.
For a discussion of the Court's treatment of free expression in public schools under the
Equal Access Act, see infra notes 129-86 and accompanying text (examining Supreme Court
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tors' Association,42 the Supreme Court developed a framework to
guide analysis of equal access cases involving the exercise of first
amendment rights.43 The Court in Perry outlined the public forum
doctrine by delineating three categories of fora: (1) the traditional
public forum; (2) the forum created by government designation;
and (3) the nonpublic forum.44
In the first two fora, first amendment protections of speech re-
ceive heightened scrutiny.45 A government may not restrict access
to the forum based on the content of the speech without a compel-
ling interest.46 In the third category, when government property is
not dedicated to open use by the community, the government may,
without further justification, restrict use to those who participate in
the forum's usual business. 47 The touchstone for evaluating the
government's decisions about access to a nonpublic forum is
whether the distinctions are reasonable in light of the forum's
purpose.48
The first step in examining an equal access case within a public
forum analysis is to assess the students' first amendment rights. The
Supreme Court has held that students do not lose their first amend-
ment right to free expression upon entering the public school.49
opinion in Mergens). Mergens is the Court's first attempt to decide a case under the Equal
Access Act.
42. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
43. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-49 (1983). But see Lay-
cock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech By Private Speakers, 81
Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 48-51 (1986) (criticizing public forum doctrine as rigid and nonsensical and
arguing that, where schools choose not to create public fora, result is loss of free speech rights
for all students, not only religious groups); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrutIONAL LAW § 12-
24, at 987-88, 995-96 (1988) (criticizing categories of public forum doctrine as often un-
helpful, manipulable, and irrelevant).
44. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 (describing traditional fora as streets or parks, governmen-
tally designated fora as "public property which the State has opened for use by the public as a
place for expressive activity," and nonpublic fora as "public property which is not by tradition
or designation a forum for public communication").
45. Id.
46. Id. The government may also enforce content-neutral "time, place, and manner"
restrictions that are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest as long as
other open channels of communication exist. Id.
47. IE at 46-47.
48. Id. at 49.
49. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(upholding right of high school students to wear armband protesting Vietnam War as consti-
tutionally protected freedom of expression). The Court stated in Tinker that a school cannot
restrict student expression on the basis of general apprehensions. 1Ld at 509. Restrictions on
student expression are permissible only if based on specific evidence that the expressive con-
duct would materially and substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon
the rights of other students. Id.; see also Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
689 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that school does not have limitless authority to
restrict student expression). Justice Brennan suggested that in reviewing whether a restric-
tion of expression is within the proper discretion of administrators, a court should focus on
the disruptive nature of the expression. Id. at 688-89.
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Because of the special environment of public schools, however, ad-
ministrators may place certain restrictions upon students' exercise
of their rights in order to carry out the educational mission of the
school and to prevent an appearance of government endorsement
of individual points of view.50 In recent years, the Court has heard
cases regarding students' free exercise and free speech rights in the
public schools and has concluded that the establishment clause
proscribes any appearance of government-sponsored religion in the
schools.51
50. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681, 683 (describing objective of public education as inculca-
tion of fundamental values necessary to maintenance of democratic political system). While
students possess first amendment rights to advocate unpopular views in the schools, their
rights must be balanced against society's countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. Id. The public school, funded in part by federal
tax dollars, serves as the training ground for the habits of the American community. Illinois ev
rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Com-
pulsory attendance laws, the impressionability of young students, and the potential percep-
tion of school sponsorship combine to make the public school a sensitive forum for equal
access considerations. See infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text (explaining why high
school forum is different from university forum). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIU-
TIONAL LAW § 14-9, at 1210-14 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing protection of public schools from
appearance of government sponsorship of religion).
51. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582-86 (1987) (invalidating law requir-
ing teaching of creation science in public schools as violative of establishment clause); Abing-
ton School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-27 (1963) (prohibiting daily reading of Lord's
Prayer in classrooms under establishment clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-30
(1962) (invalidating law allowing vocal prayer in classrooms on establishment clause
grounds); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209-12 (1948) (forbidding
use of tax-funded public school premises for voluntary religious instruction under establish-
ment clause). These cases not only exemplify the tension between the first amendment reli-
gion clauses, but also expose the difficulty in drawing the line between government-
sponsored religious activities and completely voluntary, student-initiated religious activities.
In the realm of student speech, the Court has distinguished controversial, but non-disrup-
tive speech, which is tolerated by schools, from speech that is affirmatively promoted and
sponsored by the schools. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71
(1988). Justice White compared Tinker, where the Court found that the first amendment re-
quires a school to tolerate particular student speech to Kuhmeier, where the inquiry was
whether the first amendment requires a school to affirmatively promote particular student
speech. Id In the Tinker-type of case, the Court is concerned with the ability of school admin-
istrators to restrict a student's personal expression that occurs on school grounds. Id. at 271.
By contrast, the Kuhlmeier-type of case concerns school administrator's authority over school-
sponsored newspapers, activities, and other student expressions "that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." Id.
But see Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 282-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (conceding that level of disrup-
tion may be greater during curriculum related activity than during noncurriculum related ac-
tivity, but sharply criticizing abandonment of Tinker standard). Justice Brennan saw no reason
to draw a line between government-sponsored and individual speech. He advocated use of
the Tinker standard to determine whether the speech at issue substantially interfered with the
school's educational purpose or with the rights of other students. Id. at 282 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
See also Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F.2d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 1989) (differen-
tiating cases concerning toleration of particular student speech from cases regarding allow-
ance of access to school premises for student groups to hold meetings), vacated and remanded
for further consideration in light of Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2608 (1990). The Ninth Circuit stated that
if a school allows access to religious student groups, the administration is affirmatively pro-
moting student speech in violation of the establishment clause. Garnett, 874 F.2d at 613.
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Although the first amendment protects students' rights of free-
dom of speech and religious expression at school, these rights do
not require schools to open their doors to meetings of student reli-
gious groups.5 2 A school, however, may create a public forum for
activities and limit participation in that forum to particular groups.5 3
Once a school makes its facilities available to a broad range of stu-
dent groups, it has created a limited open forum and is subject to
constitutional scrutiny. 54 Absent a narrowly drawn compelling in-
terest, the school cannot then deny student groups access to the
forum.55
Once a court determines that a school has created a limited open
These two categories of cases stem from separate factual situations. In the first category,
students are already on school premises and are seeking protection of their individual right to
free expression. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969) (finding that schools cannot restrict student expressive conduct on basis of general
apprehensions). In the second category, groups of students are seeking access to school
property to discuss religion. Because the students in the first category of cases are not seek-
ing access, the public forum doctrine is inapplicable. Laycock, supra note 43, at 48.
A student commentator drew a distinction between cases in which students are seeking
protection for active speech from those involving passive speech. Note, Beyond Mergens: Bal-
ancing a Student's Free Speech Right Against the Establishment Clause in Public High School Equal Access
Cases, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 127, 133-34 (1990). The Note aligned the expression in Tinker
with the equal access cases in the "passive" category and labeled the speech in Bethel and
Kuhlmeier as "active." Id. The students in Bethel and Kuhlmeier actively expressed viewpoints
that contradicted values the school was inculcating and, therefore, the schools could reason-
ably restrict the speech. Id at 134. The school in Tinker, however, could not restrict the
student's nondisruptive expression without violating the establishment clause. Id.
In aligning the equal access cases with Tinker, the Note assumes that a school may not deny
student access to public schools to express religious points of view without violating the estab-
lishment clause because the expression is "passive." The argument is circular and assumes as
a given the very problem that the equal access dilemma engenders-whether a school can
deny access to a student group based upon the content of their speech without violating the
establishment clause.
52. Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1400-01 (10th Cir.
1985); see also Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267-70 (1988) (invoking
public forum doctrine to analyze whether student newspaper is public forum where school
administrators cannot exercise content-based discretion to censor potentially disturbing arti-
cles). The Court in Kuhlmeier stated that first amendment rights of students in public schools
"are not automatically coextensive with rights of adults in other settings." Id. at 266 (quoting
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). While considering the
special characteristics of the public school environment in assessing the students' first amend-
ment rights, the Court in Kuhlmeier found that a student newspaper, produced in connection
with a journalism class for the purpose of honing practical skills, was not an open forum for
indiscriminate use by students. Id at 267-70. School officials, therefore, could regulate the
newspaper's content in a reasonable manner. Id at 270.
53. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983).
54. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,268 (1981); see infra notes 60-72 and accompanying
text (discussing Widmar decision); Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 267 (explaining that although school
facilities do not possess attributes of traditional public fora, they may be deemed public fora if
school authorities have, by policy or practice, intentionally opened facilities for indiscriminate
use by general public or by some segment of public such as student organizations). A school
does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse. Id.
55. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-75 (finding University's
interest in complying with establishment clause compelling, but concluding that establish-
ment clause did not allow school to suppress voluntary religious speech by private persons).
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forum, the next step is to determine whether the school's non-estab-
lishment interest is sufficiently compelling to outweigh the students'
free speech rights.56 The court then invokes the three-prong Lemon
test to determine whether the school's equal access policy violates
the establishment clause. 57 When analyzing equal access in public
schools where competing and sensitive first amendment interests
are implicated, courts should consider the nature of the particular
forum, taking into account the number of groups, the controversial
nature of the groups, and the amount of encouragement the school
gives to the groups. 58 The goal of the analysis is to minimize the
deprivation of rights. 59
C. Public Forum Analysis in a University Setting: Widmar v. Vincent
In Widmar v. Vincent, 60 the Supreme Court followed the public fo-
rum analysis and upheld the constitutionality of an equal access pol-
icy at a state university. The University of Missouri at Kansas City
officially recognized over 100 student groups and had a stated pol-
icy of encouraging student organizations. 6' Cornerstone, a group
of evangelical Christian students, conducted their meetings at the
University for four years before the University instituted a policy
prohibiting religious worship or teaching on school premises.6 2
When the University informed Cornerstone that it could no longer
hold meetings at the school, the group sued the University on free
speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection grounds.63
The district court upheld the denial of access, finding that the es-
56. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46 (explaining that government must have compelling inter-
est, narrowly drawn to achieve non-establishment end in order to enforce content-based ex-
clusion of speech from limited public forum); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-71 (considering
competing free speech and non-establishment interests within public forum analysis); see also
infra note 101 (discussing Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986), in which court found school's non-estab-
lishment interest to outweigh students' interest in free expression).
57. Id. at 271; see also supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text (discussing Lemon test and
establishment clause concerns).
58. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (examining criteria used by courts of
appeals to analyze equal access issue). For a suggested framework to identify a constitutional
open forum in the public high schools, see Comment, Beyond Neutrality: Equal Access and the
Meaning of Religious Freedom, 12 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK LJ. 335, 359 (1989-90). First, school
administrators have discretion to open the forum to student organizations; second, a forum
composed of only school-sponsored, curriculum related groups does not constitute a public
forum for student organizations; and third, once a forum generally is open for noncurriculum
related student groups, a school cannot deny a group access based on the content of the
group's speech absent a compelling state interest. Id. at 359-60.
59. See Comment, supra note 58, at 367-68 (claiming that aim of Lemon test analysis is to
prevent excessive government entanglement with religious rights).
60. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
61. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 266.
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tablishment clause compelled the exclusion.64 The Eighth Circuit
reversed, finding no compelling justification for the University's
content-based discrimination against religious speech.65 The court
of appeals determined that equal access to the University was neu-
tral in effect and was, therefore, not barred by the establishment
clause.66 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Eighth
Circuit. 67
In Widmar, the Court recognized that the first amendment rights
of speech and association extend to the campuses of state universi-
ties. 68 Finding that the University of Missouri at Kansas City created
a forum generally open for use by student groups, the Court as-
serted that, absent a compelling state interest, the University could
not deny students the ability to exercise their first amendment
rights.69 Although the Court accepted the University's claim that
compliance with its constitutional obligation to maintain a strict sep-
aration of church and state constituted a compelling state interest, it
held that the interest was not "sufficiently compelling" given the va-
riety of student organizations that existed on campus. 70 The Court
stated that an equal access policy in which religious groups are al-
lowed to meet on campus would not offend the establishment
clause. 71 In closing, the Court stressed the narrow scope of its deci-
64. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 914-17 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 1310
(8th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
65. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1315-17 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nor. Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
66. Id. at 1317-20.
67. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
68. Ia at 268-69.
69. Ia at 267-68. The Court recognized that the campus of a state university possesses
many of the characteristics of a public forum. Ia at 267-68 & n.5. Relying primarily upon its
decision in Healy v. James, extending public forum doctrine to a university setting, the Court
described the campus at the University as a "public forum" which is truly the "marketplace of
ideas." Id (quoting Healy v.James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1971)). The Court noted that univer-
sities differ in significant respects from traditional public fora such as streets, parks, and mu-
nicipal theatres. Id A university's mission is to educate its students. The administration
retains discretion, therefore, to impose reasonable regulations compatible with its mission,
including restricted access to its campus and facilities. Ia Specifically, a university is not
required to open its forum to nonstudents. Id Later in the opinion, the Court referred to the
University's student activity program as a "limited public forum." Id at 272; see supra notes
41-58 and accompanying text (discussing public forum analysis).
70. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276-77.
71. IL at 276. The Court in Widmar applied the three-prong Lemon test to determine
whether the University's equal access policy violated the establishment clause. IA at 271-75;
see also supra notes 13-28 and accompanying text (discussing Lemon test).
The Court in Widmar quickly dismissed the secular purpose and entanglement prongs of the
Lemon test, relying on the lower courts' finding that an open forum policy would avoid a reli-
gious purpose or government entanglement. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-72. The Court con-
ceded that religious groups would foreseeably benefit from the University's equal access
policy, but found that the benefits would be "incidental" and would not constitute an ad-
vancement of religion. Id. at 273. The Court supported this conclusion by reasoning that:
(1) the open forum did not confer the school's approval to any particular group more than to
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sion, confining it to a university forum generally open to student
groups.7 2
D. The Equal Access Act
Three years after the Court's decision in Widmar and in the wake
of a failed constitutional amendment to allow prayer in the public
schools, 73 Congress passed the Equal Access Act. The Act extended
the applicability of the Widmar equal access policy to public secon-
dary schools. 74 Congress intended to prevent discrimination
against religious student groups in public schools and to provide
any other; and (2) the large number of organizations participating in the forum provided a
broad spectrum of groups which the Court considered an index of secular effect. Id. at 274-
75. The Court also noted that the maturity level of college students, as compared to younger
students, makes them capable of recognizing the University's neutral role in the forum. Id. at
274 n.14. College students are not likely to perceive state sponsorship ofany particular view-
point in the University's open forum setting. Id at 274; see infra note 88 (discussing difference
in maturity level between high school and college students).
72. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. The Court's emphasis on the narrowness of its holding is
important when considering the impact of Widmar on lower courts. A narrow reading of the
case, as advocated by the Court, limits the constitutionality of equal access to the generally
open university forum at issue in the case. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356,
2383 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (urging that Congress, in enacting Equal Access Act,
defined forum more narrowly than Court's recent interpretation).
73. See 130 CONG. REC. 205 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (proposing Hatch Amend-
ment for voluntary silent prayer or meditation in public schools); id. at 5421 (statement of
Sen. Dixon) (discussing Dixon amendment providing constitutional right for silent prayer or
reflection in public elementary and secondary schools). In 1983 and 1984, Congress consid-
ered silent and vocal prayer amendments and an equal access amendment to the Constitution.
Teitel, supra note 24, at 543-44. Despite the backing of the Reagan administration, these
amendments failed. l
74. Equal Access Act, Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1302-04 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988)). The Act states in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal
financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting
within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical,
or other content of the speech at such meetings.
(b) A public secondary school has a limited open forum whenever such school
grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student
groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.
(c) Schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to
conduct a meeting within its limited open forum if such school uniformly provides
that-
(1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated;
(2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the government, or its
agents or employees;
(3) employees or agents of the school or government are present at religious
meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity;
(4) the meeting does not materially and substantially interfere with the orderly
conduct of educational activities within the school; and
(5) nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control, or regularly attend activi-
ties of student groups.
(f) Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the authority of the
school, its agents or employees, to maintain order and discipline on school premises,
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guidance on the equal access question to uncertain courts of
appeals. 75
The Act allows access to and prohibits discriminatory treatment
against any "noncurriculum related" student groups, regardless of
the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of their
speech if the school maintains a "limited open forum."' 76 Although
Congress included a subsection of definitions, the phrases "noncur-
riculum related," "noninstructional time," and "limited open fo-
rum" caused great confusion among members of Congress during
debates on the Act, and subsequently among courts interpreting the
Act.77
to protect the well-being of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance of
students at meetings is voluntary.
Section 4072: As used in this subchapter-
(I) The term "secondary school" means a public school which provides secondary
education as determined by State law.
(2) The term "sponsorship" includes the act of promoting, leading, or participating
in a meeting. The assignment of a teacher, administrator, or other school employee
to a meeting for custodial purposes does not constitute sponsorship of the meeting.
(3) The term "meeting" includes those activities of student groups which are per-
mitted under a school's limited open forum and are not directly related to the school
curriculum.
(4) The term "noninstructional time" means time set aside by the school before ac-
tual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction ends.
20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4072 (1988). See Equal Access: A First Amendment Question, Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciary on S. 815 and S. 1059, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter
Hearings] (providing statements regarding early equal access legislation specifically drafted to
allow students to meet on school premises during extracurricular periods for religious pur-
poses). Senator Hatfield stated that the Religious Speech Protection Act of 1983, S. 815 (one
of the predecessor bills to the Equal Access Act), was a "straightforward measure to apply the
Supreme Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), to public high schools
which receive federal aid." Hearings, supra, at 5 (statement of Sen. Hatfield). Senator
Hatfield's bill was premised on the free speech rights of students rather than upon their free
exercise rights. Id.; see also id. at 9 (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (explaining that Widmar should
apply to public secondary schools); id. at 247 (statement of Ms. Ruti G. Teitel, assistant direc-
tor, Legal Affairs Department, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith) (suggesting that
state's coercive effect is different at high school level than at college level and arguing that
equal access policy outlined in Widmar should be confined to university setting).
75. See generally Hearings, supra note 74. During the hearings on S. 815 and S. 1059, Sena-
tor Thurmond, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, expressed the intent behind the bills
when he stated that "today we will consider legislation directed toward overturning the fifth
circuit's decision last year in the case of Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School
District." Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Thurmond). In Lubbock, the Fifth Circuit held that meet-
ings of student-initiated religious groups on school premises would violate the establishment
clause. Id; see infra note 98 (discussing Lubbock decision). Senator Thurmond argued that
Lubbock represented affirmative government hostility toward religion and that equal access
would allow students the right to free exercise of religion. Hearings, supra note 74, at 4 (state-
ment of Sen. Thurmond). It is clear that Congress originally drafted equal access legislation
to constitutionalize religious meetings on school premises. Id.
76. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988).
77. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. 20,938 (1984) /statement of Rep. Kastenmeir) (expressing
fear that language of Act was ambiguous and open to misinterpretation and misrepresenta-
tion); id. at 20,941 (statement of Rep. Goodling) (proposing two-part inquiry to determine
whether student group meets definition of "noncurriculum related student groups" for pur-
poses of Act). A court should ask, first, whether the subject matter of the meeting is a type
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The Act went through several revisions and amendments because
of the emotionally charged nature of the issue of religion in the pub-
lic schools. 78 Supporters of equal access legislation saw the Act as
protecting the right of religious student groups to meet in public
schools on an equal footing with other groups. 79 Opponents saw
the legislation as an alternative to prayer in the schools and as a way
which the public schools could sponsor, and second, does the school or teacher require or
directly encourage student participation in the group in connection with curriculum course
work. If both parts of test are satisfied, the group is curricular and does not trigger the Act).
l at 20,945 (statement of Rep. Fish) (noting that House would be abdicating responsibility as
legislators by rushing through language of bill before understanding ramifications of lan-
guage).
Even after the Act was passed, courts ignored its mandate and found equal access policies in
secondary schools to violate the establishment clause. See Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School
Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1407 (10th Cir. 1985) (enjoining religious meetings on premises of
elementary and secondary schools on establishment clause grounds); see also infra note 101
(discussing courts of appeals treatment of Equal Access Act).
78. See generally Teitel, supra note 24, at 543-47 (providing detailed account of legislative
history and discussing early bills allowing access for religious groups at both elementary and
secondary school level). Among the early bills was a prior Equal Access Act, S. 1059, intro-
duced by Senator Denton, which made it unlawful to deny equal access to voluntary student
or faculty religious groups to meet on premises of federally funded elementary or secondary
schools. S. 1059, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 74, at 292.
Senator Hatfield introduced S. 815, the Religious Speech Protection Act of 1983, S. 815,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 74, at 289, limiting the scope of
equal access to voluntary student religious groups meeting on premises of public secondary
schools that "generally" allow student groups to meet during noninstructional periods. S.
815 was revised and combined with H.R. 4996. Teitel, supra note 24, at 545 n.69. The re-
vised Religious Speech Protection Act prohibited school sponsorship of religious clubs and
limited equal access to secondary schools. Id. Notwithstanding its limited scope, the revised
Act failed to gain adequate support. Id at 545-46. Opponents of the Religious Speech Pro-
tection Act, as proponents of separation of church and state, supported H.R. 5439, an amend-
ment to Title XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. H.R. 5439, introduced by Representative
Edwards, prohibited discrimination based on the content of students' speech against any stu-
dent groups seeking to meet on the grounds of a public secondary school. H.R. 5439 pro-
tected all student groups and did not refer specifically to religious groups. H.R. 5439, 98th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984).
In order to pacify detractors who criticized equal access to secondary schools on establish-
ment clause grounds, Congress followed the free speech approach of H.R. 5439 and broad-
ened the scope of protected groups in the final version of the Equal Access Act. Seesupra note
74 (providing text of final version). However, it is clear that despite the inclusion of other
types of student speech in the Act, the purpose of even the final version of the Act was to
provide specific protection for student religious groups. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc. 19,216
(1984) (statement of Sen. Denton) (stating purpose of amendment to Act is to provide same
rights to students engaging in religious speech as are afforded students discussing chess, poli-
tics, or philosophy and stating that it is wrong for religious speech to receive less protection
than other speech)- id. at 19,218 (statement of Sen. Dixon) (discussing need for equal access
provision for religious groups); id. at 19,220 (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (expressing need for
protection of freedom of speech of religious clubs).
79. See, e.g., id. at 20,943 (statement of Rep. Smith) (urging support for legislation as it
protects free speech of religious, political, philosophical, or other speech); id. at 20,943-44
(statement of Rep. McEwen) (arguing that Act upholds constitutional freedoms of speech,
religion, and assembly); id. (statement of Rep. Rogers) (stating that Act carries through intent
of founding fathers by allowing free expression of religious beliefs in open, non-government-
sponsored forum). See generally Comment, The Equal Access Act: Is It a Solution or Part of the
Problem?, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 353 (1986) (discussing legislative history and problems in
implementation of Act).
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for states to sanction student religious activities.8 0 In order to con-
vince detractors that the Act did not offend the establishment
clause, supporters of the legislation broadened the scope of first
amendment protection under the Act to include access for all types
of student groups."' After more than two years of hearings and
committee meetings on a variety of equal access bills, Congress
passed the Equal Access Act as part of the Math Science Bill, an
amendment to the Education for Economic Security Act.8 2 The ex-
tensive debate surrounding the passage of the Senate's final version
highlighted the division within Congress and its uncertainty over the
language of the Act.8 3 While ensuring passage of the Act, the inclu-
sion of secular student groups into the protection of the Act did not
obscure Congress' purpose-protection of religious speech.8 4
E. Prior Treatment of Religious Student Groups in
Public Secondary Schools
1. A high school forum is diferent than a university forum
Like state universities, public high schools receive government
funds and serve an overall purpose of educating students.8 5 The
environment at a public secondary school, however, is different
80. See 130 CONG. REC. 20,933 (1984) (statement of Rep. Schumer) (criticizing revised
version of legislation). Representative Schumer warned members of the House that "[I]f this
bill passes, we will add a fourth "R" to the curriculum of our schools. There will be reading,
'riting, 'rithmetic and religion, because there is nothing, not even in this new improved ver-
sion of the bill, that prevents religious services in the schools before and after classes." Id.
81. Id. at 20,948 (statement of Rep. Hall).
82. Id at 19,252.
83. See id at 19,211-53 (providing statements of senators during debate over final ver-
sion of Act). While the Court's decision in Widmar was repeatedly mentioned, there was no
consensus on the meaning of the terms "limited open forum" or "noncurriculum related"
activity. See id at 19,227 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (stating that even authors of
amendment have difficulty comprehending its meaning); id. at 19,236 (statement of Sen.
Levin) (stating that courts will ultimately decide whether Widmar extends to secondary
schools).
In an effort to clarify uncertainty over the meaning of the Act, the House issued "Equal
Access Guidelines" soon after the passage of the Act. Id. at 32,315-18. These guidelines'
were not intended as legislative history and do not reflect the position of Congress or the
United States Government. Id. at 32,315. The guidelines' authors asserted that a limited
open forum is created when students are allowed to organize meetings during noninstruc-
tional time to discuss a subject not directly related to the school curriculum. Id. at 32,316.
Although the guidelines state that local school officials are to decide what is curriculum re-
lated and what is not, it is suggested that a Spanish or drama club is curriculum related while a
service or religious club is not. Id
84. See id at 19,240 (statement of Sen. Biden) (expressing interest in getting God back
into schools); id. at 19,242 (statement of Sen. Jepsen) (remarking that following defeat of
school prayer amendments, next step must be to restore religion to schools); id. at 19,229
(statement of Sen. Denton, one of the bill's sponsors) (stating that underlying purpose of Act
was to focus on religious speech because it had been singled out as target for censorship).
85. See generally Teitel, supra note 24, at 580-82 (describing level of governmental control
over public schools and universities in terms of funding).
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from the environment typified by the state university at issue in
Widmar.8 6 Students attend public high schools involuntarily and
usually do not select their course of study.8 7 High school students
are, with few exceptions, younger than their college counterparts
and, arguably, are more susceptible to peer pressure.88 Further-
more, younger students may still be developing a personal set of
values and may seek guidance from teachers, coaches, advisors, and
86. Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,274 n.14 (1981) (claiming that college students are
less impressionable than high school students).
87. See Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038,
1046 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing compulsory attendance laws), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155
(1983).
88. See id. at 1043 (listing 1960s Supreme Court decisions citing impressionability of stu-
dents as factor in barring state-sponsored Bible reading and prayer in schools).
The Court's distinction between the maturity level of college students and younger stu-
dents should be considered in equal access cases involving public high schools. There are
strong proponents on both sides of the equal access argument who maintain that courts
should consider the age difference and difference in maturity levels of college students and
younger students. Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) (urging that
varying levels of age and maturity of students are relevant factors for equal access analysis)
with Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 564-65 (3d Cir. 1984) (Adams,
J., dissenting) (contending that age and maturity differences among students are irrelevant
factors), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986). For example, Judge Adams stated that,
It is inconsistent to accept, on the one hand, a level of intellectual sophistication
among high school students sufficient to consider and contribute to the exchange of
controversial views and yet, on the other hand, to declare them incapable of discern-
ing the distinction between a school's creation of a public forum that may permit
religious speech and an endorsement of such activity.
Bender, 741 F.2d at 564-65 (Adams, J., dissenting). Justice Powell agreed with Judge Adams'
viewpoint in his dissenting opinion in Bender. Il at 556 (Powell,J., dissenting). Justice Powell
stated that the few years difference in age between college and high school students is irrele-
vant in this age of mass media information. Il
While Professor Tribe advocates a policy of equal access in public secondary schools, he
suggests that the age of students may be a factor in prohibiting otherwise permissible released
time and equal access policies. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTrrIONAL LAW § 14-5, at 1177 (2d
ed. 1988). According to Tribe, the exclusion of religious groups from an otherwise open
forum would constitute government hostility rather than accommodation of free exercise be-
liefs. Id. He emphasized, however, that young students are likely to be susceptible to coer-
cion and intimidation. Id. While student-initiated coercion in the form of peer pressure
cannot be considered state action, a school should anticipate peer pressure and respond to it
when the pressure results foreseeably ard directly from a state program. Id.
Commentators have labeled this age-related factor the "impressionability rationale." See
Note, supra note 51, at 160 (criticizing theory purporting that high school students should be
distinguished from university students for equal access analysis as inconsistent with free
speech jurisprudence and unsupported by facts); Comment, The EqualAccess Act of 1984: Con-
gressional and Free Speech Limits of the Establishment Clause in Public High Schools, 16 J.L. & EnUc.
167, 178-79 (1987) (finding inherent contradictions in theory and arguing that thesis leads to
suppression of free speech based on unsubstantiated fears). But see Brief of National School
Boards Association in Support of Petitioners at 29, Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct.
2356 (1990) (No. 88-1597) (suggesting that anyone, regardless of age, would receive impres-
sion of school sponsorship of student group when school sponsors all clubs and all clubs meet
during school day in same school where all classes meet). The brief asserts that ifa hypotheti-
cal fact situation existed where "dozens of student clubs meet on high school property, at the
complete discretion of the students, with no school sponsorship or other direct involvement
... few would disagree that to refuse a religious club under those circumstances would be
discriminatory." Id Mergens, however, did not involve such a situation. Id.
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other faculty members. 89
Some courts note that the mission of the public school system is
not only to educate students, but also to inculcate students with cer-
tain values and morals.90 As a result, the public schools are some-
times labeled the "training ground for the habits of our
community." 9' Public schools foster fundamental principles of ra-
cial and religious equality as well as religious tolerance.92 As Justice
Brennan once noted, the public schools historically have served a
uniquely public function: "the training of American citizens in an
atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of
any sort .... -93 Accordingly, allowing religious student groups to
meet on public school grounds to promote their beliefs and to pros-
elytize is likely to interfere with individual students' freedom of con-
science and to impede the school's ability to "promote cohesion
among a heterogeneous democratic people." 94
When religious student groups meet on school premises in a
school-sponsored activity forum, students may not be able to dis-
cern government neutrality toward religion.95 Despite the fact that
student group meetings are voluntary, students are compelled to at-
tend high school and may perceive school sponsorship of all on-
campus activities. 96 This concern is heightened when student
89. See Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual
Rights in the Public School, 95 YAE Lj. 1647, 1678 (1986) (maintaining that elementary and
secondary school students are not yet fully developed emotionally or intellectually). But see
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 556 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(arguing that few years age difference is irrelevant for equal access analysis).
90. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (urging importance of public
school system in instilling in its students fundamental values); see also Illinois e reL McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (asserting that public
school system, through its teaching of values, is most pervasive means of preserving and pro-
moting democracy in this country).
91. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 227.
92. Brief of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith in Support of Petitioners at 28,
Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (No. 88-1597).
93. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241-42 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
94. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 216 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
95. See infra note 101 and accompanying text (providing courts of appeals cases examin-
ing equal access issue in context of public schools and prohibiting meetings of student reli-
gious groups on establishment clause grounds).
96. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1043
(5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that "[tlo an impressionable student, even the mere appearance of
secular involvement in religious activities might indicate that the state has placed its imprima-
tur on a particular religious creed.") (quoting Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
584 (1987) (discussing establishment clause analysis in context of public schools). Justice
Brennan stated that parents entrust the education of their children to public schools with the
understanding that the school will not purposely advance religious beliefs that may be in
conflict with the private beliefs of the family. L Children attend public schools involunta-
rily. Id. There is a strong coercive power in mandatory attendance and a great potential for
students to emulate teachers as role models and to succumb to peer pressure. Ia For these
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groups make use of school facilities and services to advertise their
meetings. 97 Special concern should therefore be given to an estab-
lishment clause analysis of religious activities at public secondary
schools.
2. Equal access in the courts of appeals
Several federal courts of appeals have addressed the issue of
equal access in the public school forum. In direct contradiction to
the Equal Access Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Widmar,
the courts found equal access policies to be unconstitutional in the
context of public secondary schools. 98 Each court employed a simi-
reasons, Justice Brennan suggested that schools must exercise their discretion regarding reli-
gious activities within the schools in strict compliance with the establishment clause. Id. at
584-85.
97. See Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646, 649-50 (11 th Cir. 1984)
(holding that advertising student religious meetings through use of school facilities consti-
tuted excessive entanglement in violation of establishment clause); infta note 98 (discussing
Narowicz).
98. See, e.g., Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989)
(prohibiting student religious meetings on establishment clause grounds), vacated and remanded
forfurther consideration in light of Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2608 (1990); Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984) (disallowing on establishment clause grounds, high
school prayer group from meeting on school grounds under teacher supervision), vacated on
other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that student-initiated voluntary religious meetings on school premises violated es-
tablishment clause), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
See also Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1406-07 (10th Cir.
1985) (enjoining meetings of religious groups at public elementary school). The Tenth Cir-
cuit found that the school had created a limited forum, but that the equal access policy vio-
lated the establishment clause because the school permitted and encouraged religious activity
on school premises during the day. Id at 1401-03. The court, however, based its opinion
upon the impressionability of elementary school students. Id. at 1404.
See also Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th
Cir. 1982) (finding school's equal access policy allowing student meetings before or after
school hours and on school premises violative of establishment clause because policy implied
school recognition of religious activities and implicit approval of programs), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1155 (1983). The factual situation at issue in Lubbock differs from most equal access cases
because the school had a long history of promoting organized religious activities on school
premises. Id. at 1039. After several years of pressure by the Civil Liberties Union, the school
adopted an equal access policy in an attempt to legitimize the religious activities at the school.
Id at 1040-41. The court in Lubbock followed the rationale of the Second Circuit in Brandon,
reasoning that a high school is not a public forum. Id. at 1048. The Fifth Circuit concluded
that the school's policy explicitly authorizing religious meetings on the school's premises
failed all three prongs of the Lemon test. Id. at 1048. In particular, the Fifth Circuit found that
the primary effect of the school's policy was to advance religion because of the age of the
students and the proximity in time of the meetings to the beginning and end of the school
day. Id. at 1045.
See also Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646, 655 (11 th Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing afternoon prayer meetings unconstitutional on establishment clause grounds). The Elev-
enth Circuit limited its review in this case to the establishment clause issue and did not
address the public forum issue. Id. at 647. The Youth for Christ student group enjoyed the
use of North Clayton Junior High School's bulletin boards, public address system, and class-
rooms for eleven years. Id. at 648. In addition to providing a faculty sponsor for the group,
the school district supported religious assemblies and announcements of church-sponsored
activities at the school. Id. at 649. The court focused its Lemon analysis upon the excessive
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lar analytical framework as it examined the specific facts at issue.
The courts first asked whether the school had created a limited pub-
lic forum, vesting the students' free speech rights. 99 If the students
were found to have a right to free expression, the courts balanced
this right against the school's non-establishment concerns.100 Con-
sistently, the circuit courts of appeals struck down equal access poli-
cies on establishment clause grounds.10 1 In 1989, however, the
entanglement prong, finding that the school's need to monitor the public address announce-
ments was an excessive entanglement and, therefore, a violation of the establishment clause.
Id.
But see infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text (discussing Board of Educ. v. Mergens,
867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (upholding access to public
school facilities for religious student group)).
99. See infra note 101 (indicating courts' determinations of whether a limited public fo-
rum was created in Brandon, Bender, and Garnett).
100. See infra note 101 (discussing courts of appeals holdings). In three cases, Brandon,
Lubbock, and Garnett, the courts found that the schools had not created a limited public forum.
In these cases, the courts held that granting equal access would result in a violation of the
establishment clause. Id. In Bender, the Third Circuit found that the school had created a
limited public forum, but that the school's non-establishment interest outweighed the stu-
dents' rights to free expression. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 561
(3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
101. See, e.g., Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1989)
(barring use of school facilities for faculty-sponsored religious meetings), vacated and remanded
forfurther consideration in light of Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2608 (1990); Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 553 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986)
(finding school's establishment clause concern outweighed student prayer fellowship group's
free speech interests); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981) (upholding school's decision to disallow access to classrooms for
prayer meetings). In Brandon v. Board of Education, a group of high school students sought
access to classrooms immediately before school to conduct communal prayer meetings. Bran-
don, 635 F.2d at 973. The students did not have a faculty supervisor and stated that their
meetings were voluntary and would not conflict with other school functions. Id. The school
principal denied the students' request and the students sued on free exercise, free speech,
free association, and equal protection grounds. Id- The District Court granted summary
judgment for the school and the students appealed. Id. at 973-74.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the students did not
have a valid free exercise claim. Id. at 978. The court determined that, even if the students'
free exercise rights were encumbered, the school's nonestablishment concerns would over-
ride any interests that the students had in free exercise. Ia& The Second Circuit reasoned that
"a high school is not a public forum where religious views can be freely aired." Id. at 980.
Citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969), the court acknowledged that students have first amendment rights to political speech
in public schools, but that sensitive establishment clause concerns limit their right to air reli-
gious doctrines. Id.
In Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, a student prayer fellowship group sought
permission to meet on school premises during the morning student activity period. Bender,
741 F.2d at 542. The group had a faculty advisor and a stated purpose of promoting "spiri-
tual growth and positive attitudes in the lives of its members." Id- The student activity forum
included various noncurriculum related student groups. Id. After allowing the religious
group to meet one time, however, the school excluded the group from meeting based on an
alleged violation of state law. Id. at 543. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found
that the students possessed free speech rights, that the school had created a limited open
forum, and that the religious group fell within the parameters of the forum. Id. at 546-49.
The court also determined that the school had a valid establishment clause concern. Id. at
551-52. In balancing the students' free speech claim against the school's establishment clause
claim, the Third Circuit ruled in favor of the school. Id at 553. Emphasizing the difference
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Eighth Circuit ruled in favor of a group of students seeking to form
a religious club in a public high school.10 2 The case, Board of Educa-
tion of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,10 3 provided the impetus
for the Supreme Court to address the validity of the Equal Access
Act and the constitutionality of religious groups in public secondary
schools.
II. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF WESTSiDE COMMUNITY
SCHOOLS V. MERGENS
A. Factual History
In January 1985, a group of students attending Westside High
School, a public secondary school in an independent public school
district in Omaha, Nebraska, attempted to start a Christian Bible
Study club. 10 4 As no formal policy for forming student groups ex-
isted at Westside, the students presented their idea to the school's
principal, Dr. Findley. 0 -5 At the time, Westside operated under a
between high school students and the university students in Widmar, the court concluded that
allowing the group to meet would have the undesired effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement of religion. Id at 551-53.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Bender but never reached the merits, vacating
the court of appeals' decision for lack of jurisdiction because the respondent did not have
standing to appeal. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 549 (1986).
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, however, dissented from the
resolution on the ground of standing and discussed the merits of the case. id at 551-56
(Burger, CJ., dissenting). The dissent found Widmar controlling. Id at 553 (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting). Under ChiefJustice Burger's analysis, the school could not restrict access to reli-
gious groups if other noncurriculum related groups met at the school. Id Justice Powell filed
a separate dissent adhering to Widmar and minimizing the age difference between high school
and college students in today's era of mass media. Id at 555-56 (Powell, J., dissenting).
In Garnett, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the use of school facilities
for religious meetings "unconstitutionally advance[s] religion." Garnett, 874 F.2d at 611. The
school operated under a policy that allowed co-curricular groups to meet in classrooms dur-
ing non-instructional time. Id. at 609. None of the groups, however, were student-initiated
and all groups had faculty sponsors. Id at 614. The Ninth Circuit found that because the
school's policy expressly stated that the school did not maintain an open forum, the Equal
Access Act did not apply. Ia at 613. The court determined that allowing a religious group to
meet on school premises in a tax-supported public school system with a controlled student
activity forum would violate the establishment clause. IA at 611. The court announced that
"this case is different from Widmar" because a meeting of a religious group at the school
would appear to enjoy school sponsorship. IA at 611-12. The court stated that "[n]owhere
has the Supreme Court been more vigilant in prohibiting the appearance of state sponsorship
of religious activities than in public elementary and secondary schools." Id.
102. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 867 F.2d 1076, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct.
2356 (1990). The Eighth Circuit decided this case under the Equal Access Act.
103. 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
104. Meigens, 867 F.2d at 1077. Westside High School is controlled by the Board of Edu-
cation of Westside Community Schools. As a public school, Westside receives federal funds.
Id- The Christian Bible Study club sought to meet on the same terms as other Westside stu-
dent groups, but would not have a faculty sponsor. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2362. The purpose
of the club would have been to allow students to read and study the Bible, to pray, and to have
fellowship. Id. Membership was to be voluntary and nondenominational. Id.
105. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1077.
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school board policy that recognized student clubs as an important
part of the total educational program.10 6 Although no club was ever
previously denied access to the school, Dr. Findley rejected the stu-
dents' request.10 7 After a conference involving the principal, the as-
sistant superintendent, and the superintendent of schools, the
school again denied students' request on grounds that the club
would violate the establishment clause.' 0 8
B. Procedural History
In April 1985, the students brought suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Nebraska, claiming that Westside's re-
fusal to allow the formation of the Christian Bible Study club
violated their first and fourteenth amendment rights to free speech,
free religious exercise, and equal protection. 109 The students also
alleged that the school board's action violated the Equal Access
Act. 10
The district court held that the students' first and fourteenth
amendment rights had not been violated."' In addition, the court
found that because Westside maintained a closed forum, the Equal
Access Act did not apply." 2 The district court decided that the stu-
dents had not sufficiently established Westside High School as an
open forum and dismissed the action without reaching the establish-
ment clause issue." 1
The students appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
106. Id Westside Community School Board Policy 5610 describes student clubs as "a
vital part of the total education program as a means of developing citizenship, wholesome
attitudes, good human relations, knowledge and skills." Id In addition, clubs within the cam-
pus community must have faculty sponsorship and must not be sponsored by any religious or
political organization, or by any organization that denies membership on a basis of race,
color, creed, sex, or political belief. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2362. The school board claims to
advocate a policy of free expression and recognition of respect for all religions. Id
107. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1077.
108. L
109. Mergens v. Board of Educ., No. CV 85-0-426, slip op. at 2 (D. Neb. Feb. 2, 1988).
The case was heard before Judge Beam without a jury and the decision is unreported. The
record, however, is printed as Appendix B to the petition for certiorari. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (No. 88-1597) [hereinafter Petition].
I 10. Brief for United States in Opposition at 3, Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct.
2356 (1990) (No. 88-1597).
111. Mergens, slip op. at 3, reprinted in Petition, supra note 109, app. B.
112. Id at 25-26, repinted in Petition, supra note 109, app. B (finding that all student clubs
at Westside were curriculum-related and, therefore, did not trigger Act). Following the public
forum rationale as applied in Widmar, the court determined that because Westside did not
operate a limited public forum, the school could deny the students' request as long as the
denial was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical goal. See Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2363
(summarizing district court decision).
113. Mergens, slip op. at 29-30, reprinted in Petition, supra note 109, app. B.
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the Eighth Circuit, alleging that Westside maintained an open fo-
rum and that the Equal Access Act was constitutional as applied to
their case.1 14 They further claimed that Westside violated their first
and fourteenth amendment rights. 1 5 The Eighth Circuit reversed,
finding that the high school had created a limited open forum within
the definition of the Equal Access Act and that the Act did not vio-
late the establishment clause. 1' 6
In finding the Equal Access Act applicable to Westside, the Eighth
Circuit examined the language of the statute.'1 7 The court stated
that the Act applies if a school creates a limited open forum by offer-
ing an opportunity for just one noncurriculum related student
group to meet on school premises during noninstructional time. 18
The court identified the Act's failure to define noncurriculum re-
lated as an ambiguity. 19 The court then looked to the Act's legisla-
tive history and reasoned that Congress intended a narrow
interpretation of the term "curriculum related" in order to reduce
the potential for school officials to circumvent the Act by character-
izing all student groups as curriculum related.' 20 Because Westside
allowed groups such as the chess club to meet on school premises,
the court concluded that the school created a limited open forum
within the definitions of the Act.' 21
Next, the court addressed whether the Act violated the establish-
ment clause.' 22 The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in
Widmar v. Vincent which examined the equal access issue in the con-
text of a university forum and concluded that the Act extended
Widmar to public secondary schools.' 2 3 Using the Act as a bridge,
the court applied the decision in Widmar directly to Mergens and
114. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 867 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1989), af'd, 110 S. Ct.
2356 (1990).
115. lId
116. Id. at 1079-80.
117. Id at 1078.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1079. Although the Senate debate explicitly labeled a chess club "noncur-
riculum related," the appellees asserted that Westside's chess club was curriculum-related.
Id. The Eighth Circuit held that a broad interpretation of "curriculum-related" would render
the Act meaningless. Id at 1078. If a school could loosely tie a student club's purpose to the
educational goal of its choosing, it could include clubs that fit those broad goals and remain
free to deny access to other clubs on the basis of their speech content. Id. Senate debate
preceding the bill's passage illuminates Congress' concern with the potential problems of a
broad interpretation of "curriculum related." 130 CONG. REC. 19,223 (1984) (statements of
Sens. Gorton and Hatfield). Their concern was not overstated, as appellees claimed their
chess club was curriculum-related even after Congress explicitly found that a chess club was
an example of a noncurriculum-related student group. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1078.
121. Id.
122. Id
123. Id.
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found that the Christian Bible Study club at Westside would not of-
fend the establishment clause.1 24 Under the terms of the Act, there-
fore, Westside was forbidden from discriminating against the
student group on the basis of religious content. t 25
The Eighth Circuit noted that the "only difference" between the
Act and Widmar was the extension of the equal access principle to
secondary schools.' 26 Any attack on the Act, therefore, would have
to be based on the difference in maturity level between college and
high school students.' 27 The court dismissed this difference and
held that even without the Act, an equal access policy in secondary
schools would be constitutional under Widmar alone.' 28
C. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues in Board of
Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens: whether the Equal
Access Act prohibited Westside from denying the students' request
to hold meetings of the Christian Bible Study club on school prem-
ises and, if so, whether the Act, as applied to Westside, violated the
establishment clause.' 2 9 The Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's de-
cision holding that Westside violated the Act by denying students
access based upon the religious content of their speech.'30 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court, applied the "endorsement test"
and concluded further that the Act, on its face and as applied to
Westside, did not violate the establishment clause.' 3 '
Justice Kennedy,joined byJustice Scalia, concurred in the Court's
judgment and agreed that the Act did not contravene the establish-
ment clause.' 3 2 Justices Kennedy and Scalia, however, disagreed
with Justice O'Connor's application of the "endorsement test" and
proposed a different test to determine whether the Act violated the
establishment clause.' 3 3 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Bren-
124. Id. at 1080; see supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text (discussing Court's treat-
ment of equal access in Widmar).
125. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1080.
126. Id.
127. Id
128. Id. The court noted that Congress had considered the maturity difference when
passing the Act and it accepted Congress'judgment. It- (citing S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8-10 (1984)).
129. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2362 (1990).
130. Id at 2370.
131. Id. Justice O'Connor was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Jus-
tice Blackmun in the plurality opinion upholding the constitutionality of the Act. Id. at 2372-
73. See generally supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text (discussing development of en-
dorsement test).
132. Id at 2376-78 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
133. Id. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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nan, also concurred in the judgment. 134 Justices Marshall and Bren-
nan concluded that the Act could withstand an establishment clause
challenge if Westside took steps to disassociate itself from the Chris-
tian Bible Study club. 135 Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion
in which he criticized the majority's definition of "noncurriculum
related" activities and suggested a narrower interpretation of the
Act to reflect the Court's public forum analysis in Widmar. 3 6
1. Majority opinion
Justice O'Connor began by stating that in enacting the Equal Ac-
cess Act, Congress extended the reasoning of Widmar to the public
secondary school forum.' 37 She cautioned, however, that in Widmar
the Court considered university students to be less impressionable
than younger students and more able to appreciate the religious
neutrality of an equal access policy. 38 The Court then pointed to
an ambiguity in the Act: the definition of the phrase "noncur-
riculum related student group."' 3 9 In determining the degree of
"unrelatedness to the curriculum," Justice O'Connor suggested a
broad interpretation of the term "noncurriculum" to accommodate
Congress' intent that a low threshold trigger the Act. 140 On the
other hand, a court should narrowly define those groups which re-
late directly to the school's curriculum to prevent school administra-
tors from attempting to circumvent the regulations of the Act by
claiming that all student groups are curriculum related and, there-
fore, outside the scope of the Act.141 According to the Court, this
interpretation of "noncurriculum related" does not limit the discre-
tion of school officials because the Act provides that a school may
still set its own curriculum and exclude groups that would interfere
with the orderly conduct of educational activities at the school. 142
134. IL- at 2378-83 (Marshall, J, concurring).
135. lId; see infra notes 161-70 (discussing Justice Marshall's concurring opinion).
136. Id at 2383-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see infra notes 171-86 (discussing Justice Ste-
vens' dissent).
137. Id at 2364 (O'Connor, J.) (citing language in Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a)-
(b) (1988), which limits public secondary school's ability to prohibit students from holding
religious organization meetings).
138. Id
139. Id. at 2365 (O'Connor, J.). Because Justice O'Connor found the Act's legislative his-
tory unhelpful, she turned to Webster's dictionary for instruction. Id. She concluded that
"noncurriculum related" describes those student groups which are "not related to the body
of courses offered by the school." Id
140. Id. at 2366 (O'Connor, J.).
141. Id
142. Id at 2367 (O'Connor, J.). The Court criticized Justice Stevens' narrow interpreta-
tion of "noncurriculum related," emphasizing the treacherous result of relying on the Act's
legislative history. Id. at 2367-68 (O'Connor, J.).
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The Court next addressed whether Westside had created a "lim-
ited open forum" that would place the school within the parameters
of the Act. 143 The majority agreed with the Eighth Circuit's conclu-
sion that considering all of the student groups at Westside to be
curriculum related would render the Act meaningless and frustrate
Congress' intent to prohibit content-based discrimination. 144 In de-
termining whether some of the student clubs at Westside were
"noncurriculum related," the Court asserted that it looked to the
school's practice rather than to its stated policy. 145 Reasoning that
because Westside did allow access to "noncurriculum related"
clubs, the Court found that the school maintained a "limited open
forum" under the terms of the Act. 146 The Court concluded that
Westside violated the terms of the Act by denying access to the
Christian Bible Study club.' 47 This statutory determination of the
issue precluded a first amendment analysis.' 48
2. Plurality opinion
Justice O'Connor, in a plurality opinion, addressed whether the
Act violated the establishment clause by allowing the religious stu-
dent group to meet on school premises.' 49 The plurality contended
that, in Widmar, the application of the three-prong Lemon test to the
University's equal access policy proved no violation of the establish-
ment clause. 150 The plurality further reasoned that the logic of
Widmar applies to the Act.' 51 Deferring to Congress' articulation of
a secular purpose, Justice O'Connor applied her own interpretation
of the Lemon test to the Act in the context of the forum at Westside
and found that the Act did not contravene the establishment
143. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2368-70 (O'Connor, J.). The majority did not accept Justice
Stevens' contention that Congress intended the limited open forum to be triggered only when
a school permits advocacy groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.
Id. at 2368 (O'Connor, J.). The Court stated that Congress deliberately chose to use the
phrase "limited open forum" in defining the type of forum that triggers the Act. Id. at 2367-
68 (O'Connor, J.) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988)).
144. Id. at 2369 (O'Connor, J.).
145. Id at 2369-70 (O'Connor,J.). The Court also considered the school's description of
the clubs. Id.
146. Id. at 2370 (O'Connor, J.). The Act states that a "limited open forum" exists when a
high school "grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related
student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time." Equal Access Act,
20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (1988).
147. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2370 (O'Connor, J.).
148. See id. (noting that, because Court resolves question with statutory authority, exami-
nation of result based on first amendment is unnecessary).
149. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality). Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, Justice White, and Justice Blackmun. Id
150. Id at 2370-71 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
151. Id at 2371 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
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clause.' 5 2 The plurality held that the school violated the terms of
the Act, which was found to be constitutional on its face and as ap-
plied to Westside.153
3. Concurring opinions
a. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia
Justice Kennedy agreed with the Court's broad interpretation of
the phrase "noncurriculum related" student groups and agreed that
the Act did not violate the establishment clause.' 54 He did not,
however, agree with the endorsement test used in Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion to analyze the establishment clause
question.' 55 Justice Kennedy pointed out that extending an equal
access policy to public secondary schools opens the door to clubs of
''a most controversial character" and reduces the discretion of local
school officials. 156
Justice Kennedy offered his own test to evaluate whether a school
complying with the Act violates the establishment clause.157 Under
Justice Kennedy's test: (1) government cannot give benefits to reli-
gious groups that establish a religion; and (2) government cannot
coerce any students to participate in religious activity. 158 Justice
152. Id. at 2371-73 (O'Connor, J., plurality). Justice O'Connor relied on the endorsement
reformulation of the Lemon test. Id; see supra notes 29-39 (describing Justice O'Connor's en-
dorsement test). In her analysis, she focused on the primary effect prong and emphasized the
crucial distinction between government speech endorsing religion and private speech endors-
ing religion. She stated that the establishment clause limits only the former. Mergens, 110 S.
Ct. at 2372 (O'Connor, J., plurality). Justice O'Connor reasoned that secondary school stu-
dents are mature enough to recognize that, although a school allows a student club to meet
on its premises, the school remains neutral toward the content of the group's speech. Id. The
students, therefore, can recognize the distinction between government-endorsed and student-
endorsed speech. Id. Justice O'Connor further suggested that the broad spectrum of offi-
cially recognized student groups at Westside counteracts any message of endorsement of a
particular religious group or religion. Id at 2373 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2376 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
155. Id Justice Kennedy stated thatJustice O'Connor's endorsement test "cannot be the
test." Id. at 2377 (Kennedy,J., concurring). He was concerned that a literal application of the
term "endorsement" may appear to result in neutrality when a government action is in fact
hostile toward religion. Ia at 2378 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See supra notes 29-39 and ac-
companying text (discussing endorsement test).
156. IA at 2376 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see generally Comment, The Equal Access Ac: A
Haven for High School Hate Groups?, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589 (1985) (suggesting that Act allows
schools with open forums to allow student Ku Klux Klan and Nazi groups to meet on school
premises). The Comment supportsJustice Stevens' assertion that a distinction must be drawn
between the generally open forum available to student groups in Widmar and the specific sec-
ondary school forum at issue in the case at hand. Id. at 603-04. In addition, the Comment
states that, while Widmar required a generally open forum to exist before a school had to
admit all groups, the Act is triggered by the existence of only one noncurricular group. Id. at
604. Therefore, the Act goes beyond the analysis of Widmar. Id.
157. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2377 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
158. Id.
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Kennedy emphasized that the inquiry must focus on whether gov-
ernment imposes pressure upon students to participate in a reli-
gious activity. 159 He found no such coercion resulting from the Act
on its face or as applied to Westside. 160
b. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall concurred in the Court's judgment and agreed
with the Court's broad interpretation of the phrase "noncurriculum
related" student groups. 161 Justice Marshall, adhering to Widmar
and the Court's free speech jurisprudence, determined that a school
may not make content-based discriminations against student groups
once the school has created a limited open forum. 62 Although he
agreed with the plurality that the Act as applied to the forum at
Westside did not violate the Constitution, he drew a distinction be-
tween the forum at the University in Widmar and the forum at West-
side.' 63 He warned that the Act is more likely to raise establishment
clause concerns when applied to secondary schools.164
Justice Marshall asserted that an analysis of Mergens involves the
intersection of the free speech and establishment clauses of the first
amendment. 65 He concentrated on the primary effect prong of the
Lemon test and suggested that a message of school sponsorship can
be conveyed if a school fails to disassociate itself from religious
speech. 166 Justice Marshall distinguished the forum at Westside
from the forum in Widmar where the University took steps to disas-
sociate itself from the varied student activity groups. 67
159. Ia
160. Id.
161. Ia at 2378 (Marshall, J., concurring).
162. Id Justice Marshall noted that Mergens should be guided by the Court's free speech
cases which hold that our constitutional system requires free and open debate on controver-
sial subjects. Id at 2379; see Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (stating that
progress of society and culture depend on uncensored expression by people); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 602 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (contending that nation's future depends on
leaders who must be exposed to robust exchange of ideas to expose truth); supra note 49
(discussing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
163. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2378 (Marshall, J., concurring).
164. Id. Justice Marshall noted that a secondary school presents a much more structured
environment than a university. Id. at 2378-79 (Marshall, J., concurring). As such, it is much
more difficult for a high school to disassociate itself from a religious club's speech. Id
165. IA at 2379 (Marshall, J., concurring).
166. 14 Justice Marshall focused on the type of forum created at Westside to determine
whether a message of mere toleration or of endorsement would result from letting the Chris-
tian Bible Study club onto school premises. Id Given the nature and function of the specific
student groups at Westside, the school's imprimatur was implicitly stamped on the activity
program. IL at 2380 (Marshall, J., concurring). No other religious groups met at Westside.
As the school's policy included all student groups in its broad conception of educational pur-
pose, Justice Marshall feared the message sent by allowing the Christian Bible Study club on
campus would be a message of endorsement. Ia at 2381 (Marshall, J., concurring).
167. Id (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall highlighted that the University's mis-
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Justice Marshall admonished the plurality for dismissing too easily
the possibility that Westside students would perceive the school ad-
ministration as endorsing the religious club.' 68 He suggested that
because of compulsory attendance laws and the structure of the lim-
ited activity forum at Westside, the school's environment fostered
peer pressure by which students would be coerced to adhere to the
religious club's beliefs.169 Without actively disassociating itself from
the clubs, Westside would not assure neutrality but rather would
appear to endorse religion, thereby violating the establishment
clause. ' 70
4. Dissenting opinion
Justice Stevens began his opinion by criticizing the majority's defi-
nition of "noncurriculum related" student groups. 17' He reasoned
that Congress intended to extend the rationale of Widmar to secon-
dary schools, but that it failed to emphasize the difference between
the forum that was created at the University in Widmar and the fo-
rum in a high school. 172 Justice Stevens suggested that two ques-
tions must be answered to extend Widmar to a high school:
(1) whether, under the Court's free speech jurisprudence, the high
school has established a forum comparable to that in Widmar, and if
so, (2) whether the establishment clause has different consequences
when applied to a high school's limited open forum than when ap-
plied to a college forum.'"- The dissent compared the forum at
Westside to the University in Widmar and answered the first question
in the negative.' 74 Justice Stevens focused upon the non-controver-
sial, non-partisan nature of the forum at Westside and expressed a
fear that an open forum may not be suitable for high school stu-
dents. 175 He concluded that the term "noncurriculum related"
must refer to groups who advocate partisan theological, political, or
ethical views.1 76 Under Justice Stevens' reading of the Act, West-
side had not created a limited open forum because the groups par-
sion, unlike Westside's, did not include an interest in imparting what the school considered to
be fundamental values to the students. Id He also recognized the controversial nature of
many of the student groups at the University. Id.
168. Id. at 2382 (Marshall, J., concurring).
169. Id
170. Id. at 2382-83 (Marshall, J., concurring).
171. Id at 2383 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to Justice O'Connor's use of Webster's
dictionary to define "noncurriculum related").
172. Id. at 2384-85 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2385 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
176. Id.
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ticipating in Westside's forum were "no more controversial than a
grilled cheese sandwich." 177
Having decided that Westside had not created a limited open fo-
rum, Justice Stevens analyzed the majority's opinion. 178 He agreed
with the majority that Congress intended to prohibit discrimination
against religious groups and wanted to prevent school boards from
circumventing the Act by definitional fiat.' 79 He faulted the Court,
however, for ignoring a crucial step in the analysis: comparing the
type of activity forum in Mergens to that in Widmar. 80
Next, Justice Stevens contended that Congress did not choose the
phrase "limited open forum" as a deliberate attempt to diverge
from the Court's public forum jurisprudence.1 8 1 He asserted,
rather, that the Court in Widmar used the public forum terminology
and that it was clear that Congress never intended to stray from
Widmar.18 2 If schools must follow the majority's definition of
177. I. at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2386-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. Id at 2386-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that the Court's defini-
tion of "noncurriculum related" groups as groups that are not "directly related" to the curric-
ulum is very difficult to apply. Id For example, the test places every high school football
team into a questionable category. Id Justice Stevens proposed an "advocacy related" stan-
dard to determine which groups are "noncurriculum related." Id
181. Id. at 2388-89 & n.18 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (referring to Court's opinion in Widmar
and definition of open forum as one "generally open to the public"); see supra notes 40-72
(discussing public forum jurisprudence).
182. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2388 (StevensJ., dissenting). The dissent suggested that Con-
gress was confused by a muddle of legal terminology and that even the sponsors of the bill did
not know what the term "open forum" meant. Id at 2388 n.15 (Stevens,J, dissenting). Sena-
tor Hatfield claimed that the complicated language of the Act could be blamed on the large
number of attorneys writing to satisfy too many different points of view. 130 CONG. REC.
19,225 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield). Another of the bill's supporters admitted that,
although the language was unclear, it was still better than nothing. Id at 20,946 (statement of
Rep. Hyde). Even the majority recognized that, because the bill went through several revi-
sions, the committee reports cannot accurately reflect how Congress meant the language to
be interpreted. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2365-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Teitel, supra
note 24, at 542 (explaining that members of Congress had proposed measures to extend
Widmar to public high schools).
Having decided that Westside did not create a forum comparable to the forum at issue in
Widmar, Justice Stevens did not need to address the establishment clause issue. Mergens, 110
S. Ct. at 2390 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He highlighted several problems with the Court's
establishment clause analysis, however, because he was concerned that the Court's treatment
of the issue was too facile. Id. First, Justice Stevens pointed out that in light of the Act's
ambiguous text and legislative history, the Court has an obligation to adopt a reasonable
construction of the statute that avoids the constitutional questions. Id at 2390 n.20 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Stevens looked to Congress' purpose and contended that
the legislators were principally interested in providing a venue for religious speech in public
high schools-not a "secular purpose" under the first prong of the Lemon test. Id at 2390
n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Court, however, examined Congress' purpose cursorily and, therefore, found no reli-
gious purpose. See id at 2389 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that Court could not
deduce meaning of legislative history by quoting one randomly chosen Senator); supra notes
73-84 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Equal Access Act). Attributing
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"noncurriculum related," they may be forced to exclude all student
groups in order to prevent access to a controversial group. 183 Jus-
tice Stevens suggested that Congress did not intend this result. 184
He urged the Court to adhere to Widmar and to use his own "sensi-
ble" definition of "noncurriculum related" as advocacy groups. 85
In this manner, the Court would ensure the general purpose of the
Act.186
III. CRITIQUE OF THE PLURALITY OPINION
Despite the weight of precedent in United States courts of appeals
finding equal access policies unconstitutional in public secondary
schools, a plurality of the Supreme Court in Mergens held that the
Equal Access Act did not violate the establishment clause on its face
or as applied to Westside High School. 8 7 The Court contended
that they had adhered to their decision in Widmar and to Congress'
intent to extend the Widmar rationale to public secondary
schools.' 88 The plurality's analysis, however, is flawed in three main
respects. First, the plurality admitted that the Act is ambiguous, and
a secular purpose to the statute does not mask the legislature's true religious purpose.
Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2390-91 n.21 (StevensJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens conceded that the
addition of political and philosophical speech to the Act may push the Act over the secular
purpose hurdle, but chided the Court for an incomplete treatment of the secular purpose
prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 2391 n.21 (Stevens,J., dissenting). He argued further that the
majority also failed to consider seriously the danger of allowing a religious group into a public
school. Id- at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens feared that one of the primary
missions of the Christian Bible Study club was to proselytize. Id. Even without direct school
sponsorship, therefore, peer pressure could prove harmful. Id at 2391-92 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
Justice Stevens contended that the Court should have considered whether a school such as
Westside, where administrators endorsed a policy of excluding controversial groups, violates
the establishment clause by admitting a controversial group into the forum. Id at 2392 (Ste-
vens,J., dissenting). He underscored the necessity of treating the case with the required sen-
sitivity when religious observances are brought into the public schools. Id. at 2391 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). He also distinguished Mergens, where the student groups existed collectively in
an organized form, from cases where an individual student's expression was at issue. Id. at
2391-92 (Stevens,J, dissenting). In addition,Justice Stevens raised an issue not addressed by
the majority-the disruption of the federal/state balance that results from Congress interfer-
ing with the discretion of local school boards, traditionally an area of state concern. Id. at
2392-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id at 2393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id at 2373 (O'Connor, J., plurality); see supra notes 98-101 (discussing court of ap-
peals treatment of equal access issue).
188. See Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2364, 2366 (O'ConnorJ.) (noting that legislative history of
Act supports this contention); see, e.g., Hearings, supra note 74, at 5 (statement of Sen. Hatfield)
(noting that S. 815, predecessor bill to Equal Access Act, was intended to apply decision in
Widmar to public high schools); id at 19-20 (letter written by Professor Tribe to Senator
Hatch) (explaining that extension of Widmar decision to high school forum as expressed in S.
815 was constitutional); 130 CONG. REC. 19,222 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (discuss-
ing concept of open forum and stating that concept is borrowed from Court's decision in
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yet upheld the language as drafted by Congress.18 9 Second, in ap-
plying the Act to the facts of the case, the plurality failed to consider
the specific setting of Westside High School adequately.' 90 Third,
in light of the competing first amendment interests at issue in the
case, the plurality did not look deeply enough into the secular pur-
pose prong of the establishment clause inquiry.' 9 '
A. The Equal Access Act is Ambiguous
The terms of the Equal Access Act are vague, rendering compli-
ance with its directive difficult and unrealistic. 192 For example, Con-
gress failed to define adequately the ambiguous phrase
"noncurriculum related" student groups.' 93 In interpreting the
statute, a majority of the Court relied upon justice O'Connor's faith
in Webster's dictionary to define "noncurriculum related."' 94 Justice
O'Connor wrote that "any sensible interpretation of'noncurriculum
related student group' must therefore be anchored in the notion
that such student groups are those that are not related to the body
of courses offered by the school."'195 The definition of this term is
crucial to an equal access analysis because the existence of even one
"noncurriculum related" group would result in a "limited open fo-
rum," requiring a school to admit any and all student groups into
the student activity forum.' 96
The majority asserted that, in order to give effect to Congress'
purpose of ending discrimination against religious student groups,
Widmar); id at 19,236 (statement of Sen. Levin) (observing that statute does not supersede
Widmar, but extends it to secondary schools).
189. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2365 (O'Connor, J.) (noting that "noncurriculum related" stu-
dent groups is not defined by Act).
190. See id at 2369 (O'Connor, J.) (analyzing Westside's student groups, but failing to
note non-controversial nature of groups).
191. See id. at 2371 (O'Connor, J., plurality) (arguing that possible non-secular motives by
some legislators would not invalidate Act).
192. See id at 2365 (O'Connor, J.) (finding legislative history little help in clarifying am-
biguous terminology of Act); see also Comment, The Equal Access Act: Is It a Solution or Part of the
Problem?, 8 GEO. MAsoN L. REv. 353, 354 (1986) (noting Act's vague language and inadequate
guidelines make compliance virtually impossible).
193. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (1988); see id. § 4072 (defining "secondary school", "sponsor-
ship", "meeting", and "noninstructional time", but failing to define "noncurriculum re-
lated"); Laycock, supra note 43, at 36 (stating that Act may fail to achieve its purpose because
of its ambiguity); see also 130 CONG. REC. 20,945-46 (1984) (statement of Rep. Fish) (noting
confusion and disagreement over language of Act); id at 20,938 (statement of Rep. Kas-
tenmeier) (stating that language of Act is ambiguous, uncertain, and open to
misinterpretation).
194. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2365 (O'Connor, J.).
195. Id
196. Id. at 2366-67 (O'Connor, J.). A public secondary school has a limited open forum
whenever it grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related stu-
dent groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b)
(1988).
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the term "noncurriculum related" is best construed broadly to
mean "any student group that does not directly relate to the body of
courses offered by the school." 197 Following the majority's defini-
tion, Westside's activity forum would include clubs such as a march-
ing band, a chess club, a Latin club, a drill squad, a photography
club, competitive athletics, and a religious student group.' 98 Since
all of the noncontroversial clubs at Westside could be perceived as
part of the curriculum, inclusion of one religious club into such a
forum would raise a great potential for students to perceive school
endorsement of the religious group.1 99 Furthermore, with only one
religious group on campus, the school's equal access policy could
result in peer pressure and majoritarian control of the activity forum
to the possible exclusion of minority groups. 200
Justice Stevens contended that the majority's broad definition,
subject to manipulation and difficult to apply, is unworkable in prac-
tice. 201 He suggested that the definition of "noncurriculum related"
student groups should depend upon the constitutional concern that
motivated the Court's decision in Widmar.20 2 Once a school opens
its forum to student groups expressing controversial viewpoints,
therefore, the school may not restrict access to other partisan
groups based on the content of their speech. 20 3
By narrowly defining "noncurriculum related" student groups as
those that are controversial in nature, Justice Stevens adhered to the
Court's decision in Widmar. In Widmar, because the University
opened its student activity forum to over one hundred controversial
and noncontroversial student groups, the school could not constitu-
tionally exclude a religious student group. 20 4 Justice Stevens con-
tended that it was the varied assortment of student groups meeting
at the University that triggered the limited open forum.20 5 Under
such a theory, a religious student group could only gain access to a
197. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2366 (O'Connor, J.) (emphasis in original).
198. See id app. at 2373-76 (providing list of student groups at Westside High School).
199. Id at 2380 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing danger of admitting one advocacy-
oriented group into forum at Westside).
200. See Teitel, When Separate Is Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not
Belong in the Public Schools, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 174, 188-89 (1986) (discussing dangers of al.
lowing majoritarian religious activities in public schools).
201. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2385-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Under the majority's defini-
tion, the swim team is directly related to the curriculum, but the scuba diving club is not. Id,
at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. Id at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. See id (arguing that equal access should be unrelated to course offerings).
204. Id at 2384-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-77
(1981) (stating that excluding group from broad-based forum violated free exercise and free
speech clauses); see also supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text (discussing public forum
analysis in university setting).
205. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2384 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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public secondary school forum if other controversial student groups
were also allowed to meet.20 6 In this manner, the fear of prosely-
tization and peer pressure would be reduced because the religious
group would neither dominate the forum nor attract undue atten-
tion. If the intent of Congress was to codify Widmar, the term
"noncurriculum related" should be construed to mean controver-
sial, partisan student groups. 20 7
B. Westside High School Is Not the University of Missouri
In addition to disagreeing about the meaning of the term
"noncurriculum related" student groups, Justice O'Connor andJus-
tice Stevens disagreed about the definition of the term "limited
open forum. ' 208 Both the majority and the dissent conceded that,
in drafting the Act, Congress intended to extend Widmar to public
secondary schools. 20 9 The Court in Widmar found the University of
Missouri to have a "limited public forum," one created by the
school and open for use by student groups. 210 If in fact the Act does
codify Widmar as expressly stated by members of Congress, it seems
logical that the terms "limited open forum" and "limited public fo-
rum" should have the same meaning.211 A public secondary school
creates a limited open forum under the terms of the Act, therefore,
only when it creates a forum like that in Widmar.
As both Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens noted, however, the
forum at Westside High School differs from the activity forum at the
University of Missouri. 212 The University and Westside defined the
purpose of their activity fora in different ways. Through student
206. See il at 2384-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (applying theory to Westside's forum and
noting that it was not open because it did not include controversial or partisan groups). Be-
cause of the prohibition against government sponsorship of religious speech, the government
does not treat religious speech in the same manner as other types of speech. See Teitel, supra
note 200, at 186 (discussing why religious student groups should be treated differently than
other student groups). For example, the government often supports private political expres-
sion, but is forbidden from supporting religious expression. Id. at 187.
207. See supra note 77 (setting forth Rep. Goodling's two-part test to define "noncur-
riculum related" student groups). Rep. Goodling suggested that groups such as the young
Democrats or Republicans or religious groups discuss subject matter that the school could
not support. 130 CONG. Rc. 20,942 (1984) (statement of Rep. Goodling). In addition,
schools usually do not sponsor these types of activities in relation to curriculum courses. Id-
These partisan groups would be considered noncurriculum related under Rep. Goodling's
test. Id.
208. Compare Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2367 (O'Connor, J.) with id at 2383-84 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
209. Id at 2364 (O'Connor, J.); id at 2383 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
211. See supra note 188 (providing statements of purpose made during hearings and de-
bates on equal access).
212. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2378-82 (Marshall, J., concurring); id at 2384-87 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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groups, the University intended to open the students' eyes to con-
troversial viewpoints, allowing them to develop their own points of
view and enabling them to become culturally and intellectually well-
rounded.213 In contrast, the Westside School Board viewed school
groups as a vital part of the educational process. As such, the Board
was inextricably entwined in all student activities. 214 The student
activity forum was a mechanism for transmitting fundamental values
chosen by the school board to the students.2 15
Furthermore, the University of Missouri's activity forum included
over one hundred controversial and non-controversial student
groups, 216 while Westside's activity program included approxi-
mately thirty non-partisan, arguably curriculum related groups.2 17
As Justice Marshall warned, the entry of one controversial religious
group into the forum existing at Westside would send a message of
school endorsement of religion and not of toleration. 218 The plural-
ity, however, failed to consider the specific situation at Westside in
undertaking its establishment clause inquiry. Under the Widmar
public forum framework, Westside did not create a limited open fo-
rum; the school administrators should, therefore, retain reasonable
discretion to exclude student groups.
C. The Equal Access Act Fails the Secular Purpose Inquiry
In performing its establishment clause analysis, the plurality fol-
lowed Justice O'Connor's endorsement test and focused on the sec-
ular purpose and primary effect prongs of the inquiry.219 The
plurality stated that the Court is normally deferential to the legisla-
ture's statement of purpose and, therefore, deferred to Congress'
avowed secular purpose of preventing discrimination against reli-
213. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5.
214. Mergens, I10 S. Ct. at 2381 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall contended
that the application of the Act to Westside's forum would require the school to permit reli-
gious speech in a forum designed specifically to advance the school's interest in shaping the
moral character of its students. Id.
215. See Petition, supra note 109, at 473-75, 488 (providing "Mission and Goals" of school
and student clubs as appendix to petition). The mission of the school is, in part, to recognize
each student as an individual and "to provide the opportunities for all students to develop the
values, attitudes, skills and knowledge necessary to become.., contributing members ofsoci-
ety." Id at 475. The goals of the school are to develop students' basic skills in creative,
constructive, and critical thinking, problem solving, and evaluation. Id. The goals of the stu-
dent clubs are to develop citizenship, wholesome attitudes, good human relations, knowledge,
and skills. Id at 488.
216. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274.
217. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, app. at 2373-76 (providing list of student groups).
218. Id. at 2380 (MarshallJ, concurring).
219. Id. at 2370-73 (O'Connor, J., plurality); see supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice O'Connor's endorsement test).
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gious and other kinds of speech.220 That the Court "normally" de-
fers to Congress' stated purpose is not persuasive in the context of
an establishment clause analysis concerning the balance of compet-
ing first amendment interests. 22 1 The plurality found the Act to be
facially neutral, granting equal access to religious and non-religious
groups alike, and concluded that the Act's purpose was not to en-
dorse or disapprove of religion. 222 This facial consideration of the
Act, however, is too facile.
The Act appears neutral on its face, encompassing religious, polit-
ical, philosophical, and other student groups in its protection. 223
The "preeminent purpose" of Congress, however, was to provide a
venue for religion to enter the public schools. 224 This purpose can
be seen in an examination of the actual language and legislative his-
tory of the Act.225 Traditionally, prayer in the schools is forbidden
as violative of the establishment clause. 226 If the Court had re-
viewed the bills introduced before the Act's passage more carefully,
it would have discovered Congress' true intent.227 As a result, the
Act should fail the secular purpose prong of the establishment
clause inquiry.
Finding that a statute violates the secular purpose prong of an
establishment clause inquiry obviates the need to inquire further.228
The plurality held, however, that the Act had a secular purpose and
continued the analysis with the primary effect and excessive entan-
glement prongs of the inquiry.229 In both of these discussions, the
220. Id at 2371 (O'ConnorJ., plurality) (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586
(1987)).
221. See supra note 17 (providing Justice Brennan and Justice Powell's views concerning
deferral to legislature when analyzing secular purpose prong in context of public secondary
school).
222. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2371 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
223. See supra note 74 (providing text of Act).
224. See supra note 17 (providing Justice Brennan's interpretation of secular purpose
prong, stating that Court must seek "preeminent purpose").
225. See supra note 78 (providing list of predecessor bills). While all types of student
groups are covered by the Act's protection, special attention was paid to the protection of
religious speech. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(3) (1988) (stating that employees or agents of
school may be present at meetings of religious groups in nonparticipatory capacity only).
226. See supra note 51 (citing cases that have addressed school prayer issue).
227. See 130 CONG. REC. 20,942 (1984) (statement of Rep. Ackerman) (finding that "this
bill looks like school prayer, it tastes like school prayer, and it smells like school prayer").
228. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 550-51 (3d Cir. 1984)
(stating that failing any one prong of establishment clause test raises valid defense), vacated on
other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
229. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2371-73 (O'Connor, J., plurality). One student commentator
stated that a school's purpose in having an equal access policy is rarely questioned and that
the establishment clause inquiry should focus on the second two prongs of the Lemon test.
Comment, The Equal Access Act of 1984: Congressional and Free Speech Limits of the Establishment
Clause in the Public High Schools, 16 J.L. & EDUC. 167, 177 (1987). This Comment, however,
misinterprets the secular purpose inquiry. The courts should examine the legislators' pur-
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plurality failed to consider fully the specific situation existing at
Westside High School. 230
1. The Act has the primary effect of endorsing religion
The plurality maintained that an equal access policy would not
have the primary effect of endorsing or advancing religion because
secondary school students are mature enough to discern the differ-
ence between forbidden government-sponsored religious speech
and protected individual religious speech. 23 1 As a general proposi-
tion, Justice Powell may have been correct when he stated in his
dissent in Bender v. Williamsport Area School District that, in today's era
of mass media, the age difference between high school students and
college students should not be relevant. 232 This proposition, how-
ever, does not hold true in the specific environment at Westside
High School where no controversial student groups met, where the
school expressed recognition of student clubs as "a vital part of the
total educational program, ' 233 and where all student clubs had
faculty sponsors.234
The plurality asserted that an appearance of endorsement of reli-
gion resulting from mandatory attendance and student emulation of
teachers would be avoided because of the Act's restriction of meet-
ings to "noninstructional time."'23 5 Although the plurality recog-
nized the risk of student peer pressure, it maintained that there is
little risk of government endorsement or coercion where no formal
classroom activity or school official participation is involved. 236 The
plurality placed little faith in the coercive nature of peer pressure.2 3 7
Despite the Court's broad definition of "noncurriculum related"
student groups, all of the groups at Westside could be categorized
as curriculum related. 23 8
pose-not the school administrator's purpose in implementing the policy. See supra notes 16-
18 and accompanying text (discussing secular purpose and Lemon test).
230. Mergens, 10 S. Ct. at 2371-73 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
231. Id at 2372 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
232. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 556 (1986) (Powell, J., dis-
senting); see supra note 88 (discussing impressionability rationale).
233. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2362 (O'Connor, J.) (quoting School Board Policy 5610).
234. Id.
235. Id at 2372 (O'Connor, J., plurality). The definition of "noninstructional time" is
somewhat ambiguous. "The term 'noninstructional time' means time set aside by the school
before actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction ends." 20
U.S.C. § 4072(4) (1988). It is unclear from this definition whether students may meet be-
tween classes.
236. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
237. See Note, Equal Access Upheld as the Lemon Test Sours, 39 DE PAUL L. REv. 1281, 1316
(1990) (discussing Justice Marshall's opinion in Mergens and suggesting that peer pressure
amounts to endorsement when state has structured school environment).
238. Id. at 2366 (O'Connor, J.). In fact, the district court determined that all of the
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Contrary to the plurality's statement, the spectrum of student
groups at Westside was not broad because no controversial groups
met.23 9 The plurality was correct in noting that if the school main-
tained a limited open forum they could not deny access to a Jewish
student group, a Young Democrats' club, or a philosophy club. 240
There was not, however, a limited open forum at Westside.241 Un-
less the school ceased to be involved with the student activity forum,
an equal access policy at Westside, by its very existence, would cre-
ate the appearance of school sponsorship of religious speech in vio-
lation of the primary effect prong of the establishment clause
inquiry. 242
2. The Act promotes excessive entanglement by school officials
The plurality dismissed the school's excessive entanglement argu-
ment because the Act forbids faculty sponsorship of religious
groups and allows only custodial oversight of student meetings.243
In addition, the plurality contended that a denial of equal access
would result in greater entanglement with religion because of the
need for monitoring student speech to prevent religious speech at
meetings.244 The plurality, however, failed to consider that the Act
does not forbid student use of the public address system, bulletin
boards, or school newspapers to advertise the religious meetings.
Furthermore, under the terms of the Act, schools will need to con-
tinually monitor student group announcements and meetings to en-
sure that there is no message of excessive school entanglement with
the, activities. 245 Other courts have found these types of activities to
violate the excessive entanglement prong of the establishment
groups were curriculum related. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (discussing
district court's holding).
239. See Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2373 (O'Connor, J., plurality) (arguing that "broad spec-
trum" of student clubs counteracts message that school officials endorse religion).
240. l
241. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (discussing limited open forum and
noting that broad range of student groups establishes limited open forum).
242. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2380 (Marshall, J., concurring).
243. Id at 2373 (O'Connor, J., plurality) (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071(c)(2), 4072(2) (1988)).
244. Id The Second Circuit noted that surveillance of meetings by faculty sponsors will
always be necessary to guarantee that participation in the meetings remains voluntary. Bran-
don v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
Furthermore, the Act states that no expenditure of funds beyond the "incidental" cost of
providing space for meetings is required. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(d)(3) (1988). It is uncertain
whether any extra compensation paid to employees for monitoring meetings is to be consid-
ered as an "incidental" cost.
245. See Green, The Misnomer of Equality Under the Equal Access Act, 14 VT. L. REv. 369, 388-
90 (1990) (asserting that school oversight of activity forum and faculty monitoring of meet-
ings entail continuing state surveillance forbidden under establishment clause jurisprudence).
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clause inquiry. 246
Furthermore, the Court recently recognized that the job of de-
signing and implementing a high school curriculum, including an
activity program, is best left to public school administrators. 247 Aca-
demicians with training in education and backgrounds in adminis-
tration are in a better position to make decisions regarding
curricular and extra-curricular activities than judges or legislators
encumbered with inflexible legal standards. 248 Courts traditionally
defer to schools' decisions if the decisions are based on a "reason-
able pedagogical rationale" even when the court disagrees with the
school's choice.249 Neither courts nor Congress should divest local
school districts of their power to shape the educational environment
of their schools. The Act forces school administrators to allow any
noncurricular student group to participate in the activity forum once
a limited open forum is created, wresting control from local school
boards and upsetting the traditional federal/state balance. 250 By
enacting the Act, Congress has intruded into the traditionally pro-
tected area of school control. The Act more than "accommodates"
student religious groups and therefore violates the excessive entan-
glement prong of the Lemon test.251
246. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 556-57 (3d Cir. 1984)
(discussing effects of using school facilities to advertise meetings), vacated on other grounds, 475
U.S. 534 (1986); Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646, 649-50 (11 th Cir.
1984) (discussing effects of excessive faculty monitoring and student use of school facilities to
promote meetings).
247. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-73 (1988) (noting that
educators' control over activities assures that participants learn lessomq that activities are
designed to teach).
248. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278-79 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (criti-
cizing excess federal intervention into realm of local school control); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (remarking that courts should not intervene in conflicts arising in
daily operation of schools).
249. BriefofAmicus Curiae of National School Boards Association in Support of Petition-
ers Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990)
(No. 88-1597) (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)); see also
Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1521 (11 th Cir. 1989) (upholding public school's removal
from curriculum of book deemed sexual and vulgar using "pedagogical" rationale from
Kuhimeier).
250. Several members of the House of Representatives voiced concern that the Act would
allow an unprecedented Federal invasion into local school control. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc.
20,937-38 (1984) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (providing text of editorial piece from New
York TimesJuly 25, 1984, stating that Act inserts federal foot in door, and it will next step on
curriculum itself); id. at 20,938 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (expressing fear that author-
ity of administrators may be restricted by Act and that Act will end up adding to burdens of
school administrators); id, at 20,938-39 (statement of Rep. Vento) (arguing that Congress
"would be pulling the rug out from under school administrators" and that Congress is "sit-
ting in Washington... pretending to know better than all the school districts. .. ").
251. See Note, Equal Access Upheld, supra note 237, at 1311 (stating that entanglement is
permissible when it is accommodating religion). As discussed above, Congress' purpose in
enacting the Act was to allow prayer back into the public schools. See supra notes 223-27 and
accompanying text (suggesting that purpose of Act was religious and not secular).
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IV. RECOMMENDATION
A. The Equal Access Act is Unconstitutional
As described above, the Equal Access Act is unconstitutional for
many reasons. First, the meaning of "noncurriculum related" stu-
dent groups is unclear. 252 In addition, neither Congress nor the
Court can decide how to construe the term "limited open fo-
rum." 253 The Act revokes the discretion of school boards to control
student activity fora without providing the on-site administrators
any guidance. 254 The Act is ambiguous and too vague for schools to
follow. 25 5 The Act also conflicts with established precedent in the
United States courts of appeals. 256 Furthermore, because the Act
lacks a secular purpose and requires schools to become involved in
religious activities, it violates the establishment clause.25 7 Congress
should not have interfered into the realm of public school educa-
tors. The Act is unconstitutional and, therefore, should be struck
down.
252. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history and mean-
ing of "noncurriculum related").
253. See supra note 77 (discussing confusion over term "limited open forum").
254. For example, the Equal Access Act does not require the presence of a monitor; it only
expressly forbids involvement of more than a "nonparticipatory capacity" by monitors of reli-
gious activities. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(3), (5) (1988). Thus, it is unclear to what extent school
officials or faculty may participate in student meetings. One member of the House of Repre-
sentatives expressed concern over the school's inability to forbid students from inviting
speakers such as Neo-American Church leader, Chief Boo Hoo, Primate of the East and "pro-
ponent extraordinaire of the sacramental use of psychedelic substances," to lecture at their
meetings. 130 CONG. REC. 20,934 (1984) (statement of Rep. Schumer). While there may be
no problem with the use of psychedelic drugs in religious ceremonies, a reasonable concern
arises when unmonitored students are given a demonstration of the powers of psychedelic
drugs at a public high school religious group's meeting. See also supra notes 247-50 and ac-
companying text (arguing that courts and legislatures should traditionally defer to discretion
of school board to select student activities).
255. See 130 CONG. REC. 20,945-46 (1984) (statement of Rep. Fish) (proclaiming Act's
ambiguity). Representative Fish stated:
We have no clear answer whether religious ceremonies and school prayer are permit-
ted. We have no clear answer whether such activities are prohibited. We have no
clear definition of religious speech. The record shows the sponsors disagree. The
debate today shows these disagreements continue. The confusion is real.
Id. at 20,945; supra notes 192-207 and accompanying text (arguing that Act is ambiguous).
256. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (providing courts of appeals cases find-
ing meetings of student religious groups in public schools to be unconstitutional).
257. See supra notes 219-50 and accompanying text (asserting that Act violates all three
prongs of Lemon test); 130 CONG. REc. 20,933 (1984) (statement of Rep. Schumer) (stating
that Act requires school administrators to decide what is religion and what is not). Represen-
tative Schumer recognized two major flaws with the Act: (1) its purpose was to get prayer
back into the schools; and (2) the use of school facilities for meetings is an implicit sanction
that the religion is "ok." Id. Representative Schumer further criticized the Act for being too
widely drawn. Id.
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B. A Proposed Balancing Test
A look at history shows that organized religion does not belong in
the public schools.258 Although individual students possess the
right to express their religious points of view at school and to meet
in organized groups off campus, that right may be reasonably re-
stricted by school administrators when students choose to meet at
school. 259 The fact-based, case-by-case analysis used in the United
States courts of appeals before Mergens is an effective way of enforc-
ing both students' individual rights and the school's interest in
avoiding violations of the establishment clause. 260 In order to pro-
tect students' rights and to maintain separation between church and
state, courts should employ a balancing test formulated under the
framework previously used in the courts of appeals. In light of
strong Supreme Court precedent prohibiting prayer in the schools,
this test should favor the school's establishment clause interest.
1. Assessing the students'free speech interest
The first step of the balancing test analysis is to assess the extent
to which the school may limit the students' free speech rights. It is
clear that if no limited open forum is created, a school need not
open its activity forum to a religious group. 26 1 The school in such a
scenario retains discretion to make reasonable content-based re-
strictions upon student speech. 262 In determining whether the
school has created a limited open forum, available to all student
groups, courts should undertake a two-part inquiry into: (1) the na-
ture of the existing student activity groups and (2) the purpose of
the forum.263 The students who are seeking access to the activity
forum should have the initial burden of coming forward with evi-
258. See supra note 51 (providing cases where Court disallowed prayer in schools on estab-
lishment clause grounds).
259. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussing right of administration to
make reasonable restrictions on students' speech on premises of school).
260. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (analyzing treatment of equal access
issue by courts of appeals). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (examining na-
ture of forum and then assessing school's establishment clause interest).
261. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-49 (1983) (ex-
plaining that government may make reasonable restrictions on expression in nonpublic fo-
rum); see supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text (discussing public forum analysis in context
of public schools).
262. See Peny, 460 U.S. at 46-49 (upholding reasonable restrictions on school mail system
on grounds that it was not limited public forum).
263. See id. at 46,49 (stating that right of access and extent to which government may limit
expression must be evaluated in light of character of property at issue and purpose for which
forum serves).
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dence showing that a limited open forum actually exists at the
school.264
a. The nature of the student activity groups
In order for the forum to be a truly "limited open forum," there
must be some controversial, partisan groups participating in the fo-
rum. For example, an activity forum including sports teams, a
Young Socialist's group, a peer advocacy group, a Civil Libertarian
club, student government, and foreign language clubs would be
considered open.265 Unless an activity forum is comprised of more
than one group advocating a partisan theological, political, or ethi-
cal point of view,266 the ability of a single religious group to domi-
nate the forum, coerce unwitting students and proselytize will be
unchecked.267 Students should be given the opportunity to choose
from a variety of points of view; the choice, however, should be a
real one. An activity program like that at Westside, comprised of
groups "no more controversial than a grilled cheese sandwich"
would not, therefore, be an appropriate forum for only one reli-
gious group.26 8
b. The purpose of the forum
Having examined the nature of the student groups in the forum,
the court next should try to gauge student, faculty, and administra-
tor perceptions of the purpose of the forum. An open forum exists
where the forum's goal is to provide an exchange of viewpoints
rather than merely to support good sportsmanship. 269 Factors to
consider in assessing the degree of school involvement in the activ-
ity forum might include: the school's stated policy regarding the
264. See P. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RU.Es OF EVIDENCE § 1.05, at 22-
27 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing allocation of burdens of coming forward and persuasion). While
none of the courts of appeals address the burden of coming forward, students are typically the
plaintiffs in equal access cases and should bear this initial burden. This Note suggests that
courts favor the school's non-establishment interest, and therefore, recommends raising the
students' burden of coming forward to a clear and convincing standard.
265. See Mahon, Chalk Talk, Mergens: Is the Equal Access Issue Settled?, 19J.L. & EDUC. 543,
546 (1990) (arguing that equal access may allow groups such as White Supremacists, satanists,
suicide advocacy, and gangs into secondary school activity forums).
266. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2385 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. See Green, The Misnomer of Equality, supra note 245, at 397-98 (suggesting that minor-
ity students.may perceive majority as receiving special consideration by meeting at school).
This commentator also argues that the access to secondary schools provided by the Act di-
rectly appeals to Evangelical Protestants looking for a place to conduct organized Bible study
and to proselytize. Il
268. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269. See id. at 2385 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that schools manifest purpose of per-
mitting or perhaps encouraging competition along ideological lines by admitting groups into
fora that advocate partisan theological, political, or ethical views).
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activity forum, the extent to which student groups advertise their
meetings at school, and the level of interaction of faculty monitors
in the student meetings.2 70 A majority of students, faculty, and ad-
ministrators should perceive no school sponsorship of the activity
program.271
This two-part inquiry into the activity forum should be applied
strictly, as it is likely that a perception of school sponsorship exists
whenever student groups meet on school premises at times closely
associated with the school day.272 Because access to religious stu-
dent groups should be possible only when a multi-viewpoint envi-
ronment, independent of the school's imprimatur, has been created,
courts should employ a narrow definition of "limited open fo-
rum." 273 If partisan groups are participating in the forum and there
is no perception of school sponsorship of the activity forum, a lim-
ited open forum is created at the school. Administrators may not
then deny students access to the activity forum absent a compelling
interest.274 The court should next balance the students' right to
free speech against the school's interest in preventing violations of
the establishment clause. 2 75 In performing the balance, the court
270. See Mahon, Chalk Talk, supra note 265, at 547 (discussing level of faculty participation
in peer advocacy group). This article discusses a peer advocacy group, sponsored by a gui-
dance counsellor, that meets at a school which has a service seal for diplomas which students
may earn according to service requirements. Id. This group is an example of a faculty-moni-
tored group where the school's participation is greater than appears on the surface.
271. See West, The Changing Battle Over Religion in the Public Schools, 26 WAxE FOREsT L. REV.
361, 399 (1991) (suggesting that one way of addressing equal access issue is to exclude "dis-
ruptive groups" from public school forum). This approach followed the Court's reasoning in
Tinker. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing Tinker standard).
272. See Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1401 (10th Cir.
1985) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969), stating that students' first amendment right must be analyzed "in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment"). The court in Bell argued further that secondary
school students are less likely than university students to overlook the presence of student
groups meeting at school. Bell, 766 F.2d at 1404. The students are more likely, therefore, to
perceive a message of school sponsorship by the mere presence of the groups in the school's
activity forum. Id The Bell court also suggested that the presence of faculty monitors at
student group meetings, regardless of their level of participation, would impart a message of
school sponsorship. Id
273. This Note suggests that a limited open forum will exist at a public secondary school
only if partisan groups belong to the activity forum. Another student commentator advocates
eliminating the test for curriculum relatedness and replacing it with a test to determine
whether the student groups seeking entrance to the activity forum are voluntary, student-
initiated groups. Note, Beyond Mergens: Ensuring Equality of Student Religious Speech Under the
EqualAccess Act, 100 YALE L.J. 2149, 2164-68 (1991). Whether the student groups are volun-
tary, however, is ultimately irrelevant to an establishment clause inquiry. Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (dismissing voluntariness inquiry as irrelevant to establishment clause
analysis). The Court in Engel stated, "[N]either the fact that the prayer may be denomination-
ally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of students is voluntary can serve to
free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause . I..." ld
274. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
275. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (describing balancing tests used by
courts of appeals).
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should favor the school's non-establishment interest.276
2. Assessing the school's non-establishment interest
If the students convince the court that the school has a true lim-
ited open forum, the school would have to provide evidence that
their non-establishment interest in maintaining a separation be-
tween church and state was sufficiently compelling to outweigh the
student's right to free speech.2 77 Next, the school would be re-
quired to show that denying students access to the forum is nar-
rowly drawn to serve the school's non-establishment interest.278
The school would also have to prove that denying access to the
group is the least restrictive alternative to achieve their goal.2 79 If
the school can provide evidence of a sufficiently compelling interest,
the court should allow the school to prevent access to the religious
student group.
CONCLUSION
Allowing religious student groups to meet at public secondary
schools triggers conflicting first amendment interests. These consti-
tutional conflicts can and should be avoided. As this Note has
shown, the United States has a strong history of disallowing organ-
ized religion in the public schools. Public schools are not required
to provide a forum for the exchange of private religious views. In
fact, parents entrust the education of their children to the public
schools with the understanding that the schools will not purposely
advance religious beliefs that may conflict with the private religious
beliefs of the family.28 0 As President Kennedy once suggested, in-
stead of praying at school, "we can pray a good deal more at home
and attend our churches with fidelity and emphasize the true mean-
ing of prayer in the lives of our children." 28 '
If, however, religious student groups are to be allowed access to
276. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987) (advocating special vigilance
to establishment clause in light of sensitive nature of public elementary and secondary
schools).
277. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981) (finding University's non-estab-
lishment interest to be compelling). The Court in Widmar stated that the University's interest
was not "sufficiently compelling" in light of the variety of groups participating in the activity
forum. Id.
278. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (noting
that content-based exclusions must be narrowly drawn to achieve state's compelling interest).
279. Cf United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (finding that incidental gov-
ernment restrictions on first amendment rights must be no greater than essential to further an
interest unrelated to suppression of free expression).
280. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584.
281. S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws 2348, 2396.
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public secondary schools, the courts should look carefully at the na-
ture of the specific activity forum at issue in each case. This Note
suggests abandoning the Equal Access Act and returning to a case-
by-case analysis of the equal access issue. The courts should assess
the students' right to free speech in the context of the activity forum
at their school, and should balance this interest against the school's
non-establishment interest. Considering the school's concern in
light of the traditional mission of the public schools, the courts
should afford religious speech less protection than other types of
speech. 28 2 In performing the balance, the courts should, therefore,
favor the school's non-establishment interest.
At present, the Equal Access Act is ambiguous and unconstitu-
tional. Its broad scope does not obscure its underlying religious
purpose. Unless a case-by-case analysis is applied, courts may err,
as the plurality did in Mergens, and uphold equal access policies that
violate the establishment clause.
282. See Salomone, From Widmar to Mergens: The Winding Road of First Amendment Analysis,
18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 295, 320 (arguing that organized religions' expression may deserve
less constitutional protection than other forms of organized speech in public school setting).
See also Green, The Misnomer of Equality, supra note 245, at 397 (stating that religious speech
does not equal nonreligious speech).
266
